

第 2/2025 號行政長官公告

Aviso do Chefe do Executivo n.º 2/2025

按照中央人民政府的命令，行政長官根據第3/1999號法律《法規的公佈與格式》第六條第一款的規定，命令公佈聯合國安全理事會於二零二一年十一月十五日通過的關於索馬里局勢的第2607(2021)號決議的中文和英文正式文本。

二零二五年二月十日發佈。

行政長官 岑浩輝

O Chefe do Executivo manda publicar, nos termos do n.º 1 do artigo 6.º da Lei n.º 3/1999 (Publicação e formulário dos diplomas), por ordem do Governo Popular Central, a Resolução n.º 2607 (2021) relativa à situação na Somália, adoptada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas em 15 de Novembro de 2021, nos seus textos autênticos em línguas chinesa e inglesa.

Promulgado em 10 de Fevereiro de 2025.

O Chefe do Executivo, *Sam Hou Fai*.

第 2607 (2021) 號決議

2021 年 11 月 15 日安全理事會第 8905 次會議通過

安全理事會，

回顧其以往關於索馬里局勢的各項決議和主席聲明，

重申尊重索馬里的主權、領土完整、政治獨立和統一，特別指出必須努力防止區域爭端破壞穩定的影響蔓延至索馬里，

歡迎索馬里聯邦政府（聯邦政府）和索馬里聯邦成員州（聯邦成員州）於 2020 年 9 月 17 日和 2021 年 5 月 27 日達成協議，敦促聯邦政府和聯邦成員州落實這些協議並在 2021 年舉行和平、可信和包容性選舉，

相信索馬里國家建設的持續進展將有助於防止包括青年黨在內的恐怖主義團體利用索馬里局勢，表示關切索馬里聯邦體制整合繼續推延，特別指出推進國家優先事項的重要性，包括國家安全架構、索馬里過渡計劃（2021 年）、第九個國家發展計劃和共同商定的相互問責框架等優先事項，以及就聯邦警察和司法系統、財政聯邦制、權力和資源分享以及憲法審查達成協議的重要性，在此方面歡迎 2021 年 5 月 27 日商定的路線圖，敦促聯邦政府和聯邦成員州從速落實路線圖，

鼓勵聯邦政府就國家安全部隊的發展需要與國際和區域合作夥伴協調，注意到這些部隊根據本決議所載措施需要獲得武器和專門裝備才能有效履行職能，

歡迎聯邦政府在武器和彈藥管理方面取得進展，包括通過了全國武器和彈藥管理戰略，敦促繼續努力編制和執行武器和彈藥管理政策，包括為所有索

馬里安全部隊建立責任到位的武器分配和追蹤系統，認識到有效管理武器和彈藥的責任在於聯邦政府和聯邦成員州，鼓勵索馬里的合作夥伴結合索馬里的國家安全架構和過渡計劃在此方面支持聯邦政府和聯邦成員州，

譴責違反軍火禁運向索馬里和經由索馬里提供武器和彈藥，特別是當武器和彈藥流入青年黨和與伊黎伊斯蘭國有關聯者手中並損害索馬里主權和領土完整，認為這是對該區域和平與穩定的一個嚴重威脅，還譴責武器、彈藥和簡易爆炸裝置組件非法供應繼續從也門流向索馬里，

譴責青年黨在索馬里境內外發動恐怖主義襲擊，表示嚴重關切青年黨繼續對索馬里和該區域的和平、安全與穩定構成嚴重威脅，特別是增加使用簡易爆炸裝置和不當利用合法金融系統所帶來的威脅，還表示嚴重關切索馬里境內繼續存在與伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯蘭國（伊黎伊斯蘭國，又稱達伊沙）有關聯的附屬組織，

重申需要根據《聯合國憲章》和國際法，包括適用的國際人權法、國際難民法和國際人道法，通過一切手段打擊恐怖主義行為給國際和平與安全造成的威脅，

認識到青年黨對索馬里和該區域的和平、安全與穩定構成的威脅不限於該團體的常規軍事行動和不對稱戰爭，表示嚴重關切索馬里問題專家小組最後報告（S/2021/849）所述的青年黨的創收能力，歡迎聯邦政府努力加強索馬里金融部門，以查明和監測洗錢風險並打擊資助恐怖主義行為，注意到聯邦政府在索馬里過渡計劃中提出的旨在發展這些能力的機構能力建設步驟，注意到金融服務對於促進索馬里經濟前景的重要性，還歡迎聯邦政府、聯合國毒品和犯罪問題辦公室（毒品和犯罪問題辦公室）和專家小組努力制定一項擾亂青年黨財政的計劃，敦促聯邦政府、聯邦成員州、索馬里金融機構、私營部門和國際社會參與支持這一進程，

表示關切繼續有關於索馬里境內腐敗和挪用公共資源的報告，歡迎聯邦政府為減少腐敗作出努力，包括於 2019 年 9 月 21 日頒佈《反腐敗法》、設立反腐敗委員會以及批准《聯合國反腐敗公約》，歡迎聯邦政府和聯邦成員州在加強公共財政管理方面取得進展，歡迎金融報告中心積極開展工作，呼籲聯邦政府和聯邦成員州繼續努力解決腐敗問題，並繼續加快改革步伐，

歡迎聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和擁有木炭目的地市場的聯合國會員國採取措施減少木炭出口，敦促監測和管控出口點現有的木炭庫存，鼓勵進一步制定索馬里國家木炭政策，旨在對國內木炭使用建立可持續管理，以解決庫存處置問題，

表示關切據報青年黨有能力利用食糖貿易，敦促聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和區域利益攸關方解決這一問題，

表示關切繼續有關於索馬里管轄水域內存在非法和無管制捕撈活動的報告，注意到非法捕撈與青年黨創收能力之間的聯繫，鼓勵索馬里當局在國際社會支持下確保根據適當的索馬里立法發放捕撈許可證，還鼓勵聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和索馬里當局與毒品和犯罪問題辦公室、國際合作夥伴及其他利益攸關方協力提高對海事領域的認識和執法能力，

表示關切加爾穆杜格局勢，重申在 2021 年選舉之前及之後和平解決爭端的重要性，並重申包容型政治和民主選舉對於確保索馬里長期和平與穩定的重要性，

表示嚴重關切索馬里境內人道主義局勢，注意到洪災、乾旱、蝗災、被迫流離失所和 2019 冠狀病毒病大流行一並帶來的威脅，最強烈地譴責任何一方阻礙人道主義援助安全運送、侵吞或挪用人道主義資金或物資以及針對人道主義工作者實施暴力或騷擾行為，

關切地注意到包括秘書長報告在內的各種報告記錄的索馬里境內令人擔

憂的性暴力和性別暴力情況，又關切地注意到，如秘書長 2021 年關於兒童與武裝衝突的報告所述，索馬里仍然是兒童死亡人數最多的衝突地區之一，還關切地注意到違反國際法在武裝衝突中招募兒童現象和綁架現象嚴重，青年黨仍然是主要施害者，敦促索馬里當局進一步加強努力，處理秘書長查明的這“六種嚴重侵害”兒童行為，包括根據第 2467（2019）號決議採取措施，

重申包容性對話和地方和解進程對索馬里穩定的重要性，重申聯邦政府和聯邦成員州必須開展建設性對話，以緩和他們之間的緊張局勢，還重申，按計劃和商定在 2021 年成功地和平舉行選舉，可使索馬里能夠重新集中精力解決緊迫問題，其中包括青年黨構成的威脅、武器和彈藥販運活動、人道主義需求、洪水、乾旱和 2019 冠狀病毒病，並使各方能夠推進索馬里的國家優先事項，

表示注意到專家小組的最後報告，歡迎專家小組與聯邦政府加強合作，並回顧專家小組是根據安全理事會的授權開展工作，

表示支持聯邦政府努力重建國家，打擊恐怖主義威脅，制止販運武器和彈藥，還表示打算確保本決議中的措施將有助於聯邦政府實現這些目標，注意到索馬里的安全局勢使得這些措施仍有必要，包括嚴格控制軍火流動，但申明安理會將不斷審查索馬里局勢，並準備對本決議所載措施是否合適進行審查，包括根據取得的進展和對本決議的遵守情況視需要作出任何修改、訂立可能的基準或暫停或取消措施，

回顧第 2444（2018）號決議第 1 至 8 段，重申安理會將繼續跟蹤了解厄立特里亞與吉布提關係正常化發展情況，並將支持兩國本着誠意解決這些事項，

特別指出本決議的目標是支持索馬里的國家建設和和平建設，為此要減輕青年黨對和平與安全構成的威脅，減少青年黨在索馬里和該區域的活動造成

的破壞穩定的影響，支持索馬里進行安全部門改革，特別是加強武器和彈藥管理，並採取以下各執行段落所述措施和機制，

認定索馬里局勢繼續對該區域的國際和平與安全構成威脅，

根據《聯合國憲章》第七章採取行動，

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第 1 部分：削弱青年黨

1. **重申**青年黨對和平與安全構成威脅，其恐怖主義活動和其他活動對索馬里和該區域造成破壞穩定的影響，特別指出需要打擊青年黨的財政，提高對海洋領域的認識，防止非法創收（包括通過銷售木炭創收），並減少簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅；

1a：打擊非法資金

2. **關切地注意到**青年黨的創收和洗錢、儲存和轉移資源的能力，促請聯邦政府繼續與索馬里金融當局、私營部門金融機構和國際社會合作，識別、評估和減輕洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為的風險，改進合規（包括加強了解客戶和盡職調查程序），並加強監管和執法，包括根據《反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為法》（2016 年）和《移動貨幣條例》（2019 年）增加向索馬里中央銀行和金融報告中心的報告，讚揚聯邦政府簽署國民身份法案，鼓勵作為優先事項開發一種獨一的索馬里身份證，以改善金融准入和合規情況，打擊資助恐怖主義行為，還鼓勵國際社會支持應對這些風險，請聯邦政府、毒品和犯罪問題辦公室和專家小組繼續交換有關青年黨財政情況的信息，繼續與利益攸關方合作制定擾亂青年黨財政和防止其不當利用合法金融系統的計劃；

3. **請**聯邦政府加強與聯合國其他會員國，特別是該區域內其他會員國，以及與國際夥伴的合作與協調，防止和打擊資助恐怖主義行為，包括遵守第

1373 (2001)、2178 (2014) 和 2462 (2019) 號決議及相關的國內和國際法，並請聯邦政府在定期向安理會報告時提供關於索馬里當局為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而採取的具體行動的最新信息；

1b：海上攔截和提高對海事領域的認識

4. **鼓勵**毒品和犯罪問題辦公室在當前任務範圍內並在海上犯罪問題印度洋論壇帶領下召集有關國家和國際組織，包括歐洲海軍阿塔蘭塔行動、海上聯合部隊和區域內其他海軍部隊加強區域合作，應對非法海上流動，阻斷可能為索馬里境內恐怖主義活動提供資金的各種形式合法和非法貨物販運，並支持聯邦政府和聯邦成員州提高對海事領域的認識，加強執法，包括提高對漁船在販運和非法貿易中的作用的認識並加強相關執法；

5. **決定**將第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 15 段的規定續延並擴展至 2022 年 11 月 15 日，並授權會員國為確保嚴格執行對索馬里的軍火禁運、木炭禁令和簡易爆炸裝置組件禁令，與聯邦政府合作並在聯邦政府通知秘書長且秘書長隨後通知所有會員國後，自己或通過“海上聯合部隊”等自願性多國海軍協作採取行動，在索馬里領海海域和索馬里沿海延伸至並包括阿拉伯海和波斯灣在內的公海上，在不無故拖延的情況下，對他們有合理理由認為載有以下物項的前往或來自索馬里的船隻進行檢查：

- (一) 違反木炭禁令的來自索馬里的木炭；
- (二) 違反對索馬里的軍火禁運直接或間接運往索馬里的武器或軍事裝備；
- (三) 給第 751 (1992) 號決議所設委員會指認的個人或團體的武器或軍事裝備；
- (四) 違反簡易爆炸裝置組件禁令的本決議附件 C 第一部分載明的簡易

爆炸裝置組件；

1c：索馬里木炭進出口禁令

6. **譴責**任何違反全面禁止木炭出口禁令從索馬里出口木炭的行為，重申安理會第 2036（2012）號決議第 22 段和第 2182（2014）號決議第 11 至 21 段關於禁止進出口索馬里木炭的決定（“木炭禁令”）；

7. **歡迎**聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和會員國採取措施減少索馬里木炭出口，再次請非洲聯盟駐索馬里特派團（非索特派團）支持和協助聯邦政府和聯邦成員州實施全面禁止從索馬里出口木炭的禁令，鼓勵進一步制定索馬里國家木炭政策，旨在對國內木炭使用建立可持續管理，鼓勵糧食及農業組織（糧農組織）為聯邦政府提供索馬里國內木炭生產數據和深入分析，以此為聯邦政府制定國家木炭政策提供依據，促請非索特派團協助專家小組定期走訪出口木炭的港口；

8. **重申**毒品和犯罪問題辦公室及其國際合作夥伴必須努力監測和阻斷索馬里木炭進出口；

1d：簡易爆炸裝置組件限制

9. **注意到**青年黨實施的簡易爆炸裝置攻擊有所增加，決定，如果有足夠證據表明本決議附件 C 第一部分所列物項將用於或非常有可能用於在索馬里製造簡易爆炸裝置，所有國家應防止所涉物項從本國領土或由境外本國國民或使用懸掛本國國旗的船隻或飛機直接或間接向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓；

10. **還決定**，如果根據第 9 段向索馬里直接或間接出售、供應或轉讓本決議附件 C 第一部分所列物項，相關國家應在出售、供應或轉讓完成後不超過 15 個工作日通知委員會，強調指出，根據本段發出的通知必須列入所有相關信息，包括擬裝運物項的用途、最終用戶、技術規格和數量；

11. **促請**會員國採取適當措施，推動那些參與向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓可能用於製造簡易爆炸裝置的炸藥前體或材料（包括附件 C 第二部分所列物項）的本國國民、受本國管轄者和在本國領土註冊公司或受本國管轄的公司保持警惕，記錄交易，並與聯邦政府、委員會和專家小組分享關於索馬里人購買或打探此類化學品的可疑活動信息，確保聯邦政府和聯邦成員州得到適足的財政和技術援助，用於為此類材料的儲存和分配建立適當的安全保障；

12. **鼓勵**索馬里的國際和區域合作夥伴為聯邦政府的爆炸物處理單位開展持續專業培訓，提供適當的設備並協調支持，以增強索馬里分析爆炸物的能力；

第 2 部分：支持索馬里的國家建設和和平建設

2a：安全部門改革和遵守國際法

13. **促請**聯邦政府與聯邦成員州協調，加快落實國家安全架構和索馬里過渡計劃，敦促聯邦政府和聯邦成員州落實 2021 年 5 月 27 日路線圖；

14. **還促請**聯邦政府和聯邦成員州加強文職部門對安全機構的監督，繼續訂立和實施對所有國防和安全人員的適當審查程序，包括人權審查，調查和酌情起訴違反國際法、包括國際人道法和人權法行為以及衝突和衝突後局勢中性暴力和性別暴力行為的責任人，在此方面回顧秘書長的人權盡職政策對於聯合國為索馬里安全部隊和非索特派團提供支助的重要性；

15. **促請**國際社會支持執行索馬里過渡計劃，以幫助發展可信、專業和有代表性的索馬里安全部隊；

16. **促請**索馬里衝突各方遵守國際人道法，並敦促他們在接到關於軍事行動造成平民傷亡的報告時，繼續迅速進行全面調查；

2b：武器和彈藥管理以及防止武器非法流入索馬里和在索馬里境內流動

17. **歡迎**武器和彈藥管理方面有所進展，着重指出聯邦政府和聯邦成員州有責任確保安全、有效地管理和儲存武器、彈藥和其他軍事裝備庫存及分配，保障安全，包括實行一個可追蹤向部隊一級提供的所有此類軍事裝備和物品的系統；

18. **重申**，聯邦政府應與聯邦成員州和非索特派團合作，記錄和登記在進攻行動中或執行任務過程中繳獲的所有武器和軍事裝備，包括記錄武器和（或）彈藥的類型和序列號，對所有物項和相關標識進行拍照，在重新分配或銷毀所有軍用物項前協助專家小組進行檢查；

19. **促請**國際社會為繼續發展聯邦政府和聯邦成員州的武器和彈藥管理能力提供更多的協調支助，特別注重培訓、儲存、支持基礎設施和分配、技術援助和能力建設，並鼓勵國際和區域夥伴協調努力，支持加強聯邦政府負責執行本決議各項要求的機構的能力；

20. **強調**有效的武器和彈藥管理將有助於削弱青年黨和其他武裝團體獲得武器的能力並減輕他們對索馬里和該區域和平與安全構成的威脅，重申為了在索馬里實現和平與穩定，所有國家應執行全面徹底的禁運（下稱‘軍火禁運’），禁止向索馬里運送武器和軍事裝備，包括禁止為一切獲取和運送武器和軍事裝備活動提供資金，禁止直接或間接提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓，直至安理會另行作出決定（如第 733（1992）號決議第 5 段和第 1425（2002）號決議第 1 和第 2 段最初所規定）；

21. **確認**索馬里國家安全部隊和聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構需要根據索馬里國家安全架構和過渡計劃獲得武器和專門裝備才能有效履行職能，重申軍火禁運不適用於：

(a) 僅用於索馬里國家安全部隊的發展、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保

障而運送武器和軍事裝備或提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓，但本決議附件 A 和 B 所列物項除外，這些情況須按本決議第 23 和 24 段的規定適用相關的批准和通知程序；

(b) 僅用於聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構的發展、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保障而運送武器和軍事裝備，但本決議附件 A 和 B 所列物項除外，這些情況須按下文第 25 和 26 段的規定適用相關的批准和通知程序；

(c) 僅用於聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構的發展、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保障而提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓，這些情況須按下文第 26 段的規定適用相關的批准和通知程序；

22. **重申** 依據本決議第 21 段的豁免規定出售或供應的武器和軍事裝備不得轉售、轉讓給任何並非為索馬里國家安全部隊或索馬里安全部門機構等最初出售或供應對象服務、或並非為出售國或供應國服務、或並非為國際、區域或次區域組織服務的個人或實體，不得提供給此類個人或實體使用；

軍火禁運規定所要求的批准和通知

23. **重申**，僅用於索馬里國家安全部隊的發展、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保障而運送本決議附件 A 所列物項，需由聯邦政府或提供援助的國家或國際、區域或次區域組織提前至少 5 個工作日提出申請，由委員會逐一事先批准；

24. **重申**，僅用於索馬里國家安全部隊的發展、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保障而運送本決議附件 B 所列物項，需由聯邦政府或提供援助的國家或國際、區域或次區域組織提前至少 5 個工作日通知委員會相關信息供了解；

25. **重申**，僅用於聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構的發展、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保障而運送本決議附件 A 所列物項，需由供應國或國際、

區域或次區域組織提前至少 5 個工作日提出申請，由委員會逐一事先批准，請國家或國際、區域和次區域組織提前至少 5 個工作日將任何此類運送同時通知聯邦政府；

26. **重申**，僅為聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構的發展、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保障而運送本決議附件 B 所列物項或提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓，可在委員會收到相關國家或國際、區域和次區域組織通知後 5 個工作日內未作出否定決定的情況下運送或提供，請國家或國際、區域和次區域組織提前至少 5 個工作日將任何此類運送或提供同時通知聯邦政府；

27. **重申** 運送國或國際、區域或次區域組織應提前 5 天把運送僅用於人道主義或保護用途的非致命性軍事裝備情況告知委員會供了解；

關於批准和通知的更多信息

28. **重申**，對於向索馬里國家安全部隊運送任何武器和軍事裝備，聯邦政府適情依據第 23 或 24 段負有提前至少 5 天向委員會申請批准或通知委員會的首要責任，所有申請和通知的內容應包括：武器和軍事裝備製造商和供應商詳情，武器和彈藥的說明，包括類型、口徑和彈藥，擬議的運送日期和地點，以及關於索馬里國家安全部隊預定接受單位或意向儲存地點的所有相關信息；

29. **重申**，依據第 23 或 24 段向索馬里國家安全部隊提供武器和軍事裝備的國家或國際、區域或次區域組織也可酌情與聯邦政府協商提出事先批准申請或事先發出通知，**重申**，選擇這樣做的國家或國際、區域或次區域組織應將事先批准申請或事先通知告知聯邦政府內適當的國家協調機構，並酌情向聯邦政府提供通知程序方面的技術支持，請委員會將國家或國際、區域或次區域組織的事先批准申請或事先通知轉遞給聯邦政府內適當的國家協調機

構；

30. **重申**，依據第 25 或 26 段向聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構運送任何武器和軍事裝備或提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓的國家或國際、區域或次區域組織有責任就任何此類物項運送或諮詢、援助或培訓的提供，提前至少 5 個工作日適情向委員會申請批准或通知委員會，同時告知聯邦政府，並決定，所有申請和通知的內容應包括：武器和軍事裝備製造商和供應商詳情，包括序列號，武器和彈藥的說明，包括類型、口徑和彈藥，擬議的運送日期和地點，以及關於預定接收單位或意向儲存地點的所有相關信息；

31. **關切地注意到**關於國家沒有充分遵守以往決議規定的通知程序的報告，提醒各國根據上文第 23-30 段規定的通知程序所承擔的義務，還敦促各國嚴格遵守關於向聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構提供援助的通知程序，包括通知聯邦政府；

32. **重申**，在適用第 23 或 24 段規定的情況下，聯邦政府應不遲於武器和軍事裝備運送後 30 天向委員會提交確認已向索馬里國家安全部隊運送的運送後書面通知，包括所運送武器和軍事裝備的序列號、運輸信息、提單、貨物清單或裝箱單和具體存放地點，確認供應國或國際、區域或次區域組織有必要與聯邦政府合作採用同樣做法；

33. **決定**，在適用第 25 或 26 段規定的情況下，供應國或國際、區域或次區域組織應不遲於武器或軍事裝備運送後 30 天向委員會提交確認已向聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構完成運送的運送後書面通知，包括所運送武器和軍事裝備的序列號、運輸信息、提單、貨物清單或裝箱單和具體存放地點，並同時通知聯邦政府；

軍火禁運的進一步豁免

34. 重申，軍火禁運不適用於：

(a) 僅為了支助聯合國人員或供其使用而供應武器或軍事裝備或提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓，包括以下方面的人員：聯合國索馬里援助團（聯索援助團）、非洲聯盟駐索馬里特派團（非索特派團）；僅在非洲聯盟最新的戰略行動構想下並與非索特派團合作和協調運作的非索特派團戰略夥伴；歐洲聯盟索馬里培訓團（歐盟索馬里培訓團），第 2111（2013）號決議第 10（a）至（d）段對此都已作出規定；

(b) 僅供按聯邦政府提出並且聯邦政府已通報秘書長的請求採取措施打擊索馬里沿海海盜和武裝搶劫行為的國家或國際、區域和次區域組織使用的武器和軍事裝備供應，前提是所採取的任何措施符合適用的國際人道法和國際人權法；

(c) 僅為個人使用目的而由聯合國人員、媒體代表以及人道主義和發展工作者及相關人員臨時運入索馬里的防護服，包括防彈背心和軍用頭盔；

(d) 運載用於防衛目的的武器和軍事裝備的船隻在索馬里港口臨時停靠，前提是這些物項必須始終留在船上（如此前由第 2244（2015）號決議第 3 段所確認）；

第 3 部分：定向措施

35. 回顧安理會第 1844（2008）、2002（2011）和 2093（2013）號決議各項決定，其中第 1844（2008）號決議作出定向制裁規定，第 2093（2013）號決議擴大了列名標準，回顧第 2060（2012）和 2444（2018）號決議各項決定，還回顧指出，列名標準包括但不限於策劃、指揮或實施性暴力和性別暴力行為，再次請會員國協助專家小組開展調查，請聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和非

索特派團及合作夥伴與專家小組分享有關符合列名標準的行為或活動、特別是青年黨活動的信息；

36. **請**負責兒童與武裝衝突問題秘書長特別代表和負責衝突中性暴力問題特別代表根據第 1960 (2010) 號決議第 7 段和第 1998 (2011) 號決議第 9 段與委員會分享相關信息，並邀請聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處酌情與委員會分享相關信息；

37. **重申**，在不妨礙其他地方的人道主義援助方案執行工作的情況下，第 1844 (2008) 號決議第 3 段規定的措施不適用於為確保聯合國、聯合國專門機構或方案、在聯合國大會具有觀察員地位的提供人道主義援助的人道主義組織及其執行夥伴（包括參加聯合國索馬里人道主義應急計劃、獲得雙邊或多邊資助的非政府組織）在索馬里及時提供極需的人道主義援助而需要的資金付款、其他金融資產或經濟資源；

索馬里問題專家小組

38. **決定**續設索馬里問題專家小組，任期從本決議通過之日起至 2022 年 12 月 15 日，並決定專家小組的任務應包括第 2444 (2018) 號決議第 11 段和本決議第 2 段提及的任務，請秘書長根據安理會第 2467 (2019) 號決議第 11 段在專家小組中包括具備性別問題專門能力的成員，還請專家小組將性別平等作為貫穿各領域的問題納入各項調查和報告，表示打算不遲於 2022 年 11 月 15 日審查專家小組的任務，並就是否延長任務期採取適當行動；

39. **回顧**聯邦政府與專家小組充分合作的重要性，請聯邦政府協助專家小組對被拘留的青年黨和伊黎伊斯蘭國嫌疑成員進行訪談，指出專家小組根據 S/2006/997 號文件執行任務的重要性，請專家小組向委員會提出關於如何支持聯邦政府管理武器和彈藥、包括努力設立全國輕小武器委員會的建議；

40. **再次請**各國、聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和非索特派團向專家小組提供信

息，協助專家小組的調查，敦促聯邦政府和聯邦成員州根據專家小組向聯邦政府提出的書面要求，便利專家小組出入查看聯邦政府在摩加迪沙的所有軍械庫、聯邦政府進口但尚未發放的所有武器和彈藥、索馬里國民軍各部門的所有聯邦政府軍事儲存設施以及聯邦政府和聯邦成員州保管的所有收繳武器，允許對聯邦政府和聯邦成員州保管的武器和彈藥拍照，允許查看聯邦政府和聯邦成員州所有記錄冊和發放記錄，以便安全理事會能夠監測和評估本決議執行情況；

報告

41. **請**專家小組定期向委員會通報最新情況，包括按季度提供至少四份不同專題的報告，包括一份關於走私和販運武器和軍事裝備的報告，以及一份全面的中期最新情況通報，並在 2022 年 10 月 15 日前通過委員會提交最後報告供安全理事會審議，敦促專家小組就報告所載結論徵求委員會的反饋意見；

42. **請**秘書長不遲於 2022 年 9 月 15 日，在完成對索馬里武器和彈藥管理能力的技術評估後，向安理會提出進一步改進這一能力的建議，並就如何訂立可用以指導安全理事會根據迄今取得的進展和本決議遵守情況審查軍火禁運措施、特別是考慮可能修改、暫停或解除這些措施的清晰明確和現實的基準闡述各種可選方案；

43. **請**緊急救濟協調員在 2022 年 10 月 15 日前向安全理事會報告在索馬里提供人道主義援助的情況以及在索馬里提供人道主義援助的任何障礙；

44. **請**聯邦政府根據第 2182(2014)號決議第 9 段並按照第 2244(2015)號決議第 7 段的要求，在 2022 年 2 月 1 日之前，其後不遲於 2022 年 8 月 1 日，向安全理事會提交報告，其中：

(a) 說明其安全部隊的結構、組成、兵力和部署情況以及地區部隊和民

兵部隊的狀況，

(一) 包括作為附件列入第 2182(2014)號決議第 7 段和第 2551(2020)號決議第 37 段所要求的聯合核查小組報告，

(二) 納入關於進口武器和彈藥分發後索馬里國家安全部隊接受單位或軍事裝備儲存地點的通知；

(b) 概述國內金融機構記錄的可疑活動以及金融報告中心為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而開展的調查和採取的行動最新情況，同時應保護敏感信息的機密性；

(c) 在有資料的情況下，說明委員會指認的個人的最新情況；

45. 請秘書長不遲於 2022 年 7 月 31 日向安全理事會通報關於厄立特里亞與吉布提關係正常化的任何進一步最新情況；

46. 決定繼續處理此案。

附件 A

須經委員會事先批准的物項

1. 地對空導彈，包括便攜式防空導彈系統（肩扛式防空導彈）；
2. 口徑大於 12.7 毫米的武器和專門為這些武器設計的部件，以及相關彈藥；

註：這不包括肩射反坦克火箭發射器，例如火箭榴彈或輕型反坦克武器、槍榴彈或榴彈發射器。

3. 口徑大於 82 毫米的迫擊炮及相關彈藥；
4. 反坦克制導武器，包括反坦克制導導彈和彈藥以及專門為這些物項設計的部件；
5. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的火藥和裝置；地雷和相關材料；
6. 有夜視功能的武器瞄準鏡；
7. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的飛機；

註：“飛機”是指固定翼、轉動翼、旋轉翼、傾斜旋翼或傾斜翼飛行器或直升機。

8. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的“載體”和兩棲車輛；

註：“載體”包括任何船舶、表面效應運載工具、小水平面面積的船隻或水翼船以及船隻的船體或船體一部分。

9. 無人駕駛作戰飛機（在聯合國常規武器登記冊中列為第四類）。

附件 B

需要發出通知才能運送給索馬里國家安全部隊的裝備和需要委員會批准才能運送給聯邦政府以外的索馬里安全部門機構的裝備

- 口徑最大達 12.7 毫米的所有類型武器及相關彈藥；
- 火箭榴彈-7 和無後坐力炮及相關彈藥；
- 按照軍用標準或規格或可比國家標準製造的頭盔；
- 防彈服或防護服，如下：
 - 按照軍用標準或規格製造的軟防彈服或防護服，或等同物；

註：軍用標準或規格至少包括關於防護碎彈片的規格。
 - 提供等於或大於 III 級標準（美國國家司法研究所 NIJ 0101.06 標準，2008 年 7 月）或國家等同標準的防彈保護的硬防彈服；
- 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的陸地車輛；
- 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的通信設備；
- 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的全球導航衛星系統定位設備。

附件 C

簡易爆炸裝置組件

爆炸材料、炸藥前體、爆炸相關設備和相關技術

第一部分

1. 下列爆炸材料和含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料的混合物：
 - a. 硝化棉（含氮量大於 12.5%w/w）；
 - b. 三硝基苯基甲硝胺；
 - c. 硝酸甘油（但按藥用劑量單個包裝/配製的情況除外）。
2. 爆炸相關物品：
 - a. 專門設計用於通過電氣或非電氣方式引爆炸藥的設備和裝置（例如點火裝置、引爆裝置、點火器、導爆索）。
3. 第 1 和 2 段所列物項的“生產”或“使用”所需的“技術”。

第二部分

1. 下列爆炸材料和含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料的混合物：
 - a. 硝銨燃油炸藥（銨油炸藥）；
 - b. 硝酸乙二醇；
 - c. 季戎四醇四硝酸酯；
 - d. 氯化吡咯；
 - e. 三硝基甲苯（梯恩梯）。
2. 炸藥前體：

- a. 硝酸銨；
- b. 硝酸鉀；
- c. 氯酸鈉；
- d. 硝酸；
- e. 硫酸。

Resolution 2607 (2021)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 8905th meeting, on 15 November 2021

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, and *underscoring* the importance of working to prevent destabilising effects of regional disputes from spilling over into Somalia,

Welcoming the agreements reached between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS) on 17 September 2020 and 27 May 2021, *urging* the FGS and FMS to implement these agreements and conduct peaceful, credible and inclusive elections in 2021,

Believing that sustained progress in state-building in Somalia will prevent terrorist groups, including Al-Shabaab from exploiting the situation in Somalia, *expressing concern* about continued delays in consolidating Somalia's federal system, *underscoring* the importance of progress on national priorities, including the National Security Architecture, the Somalia Transition Plan (2021) (STP), the ninth National Development Plan and the jointly-agreed Mutual Accountability Framework, and reaching agreement on a federated police and justice system, fiscal federalism, power- and resource-sharing, and the constitutional review, in this regard *welcoming* the roadmap agreed on 27 May 2021, and *urging* the FGS and the FMS to implement it without delay,

Encouraging the FGS to coordinate with international and regional partners regarding its needs in developing its National Security Forces, *noting* that these forces require access to weapons and specialist equipment, in accordance with the measures in this resolution, in order to perform their functions effectively,

Welcoming progress made by the FGS on weapons and ammunition management (WAM), including the adoption of the National WAM Strategy, *urging* continued work codifying and implementing weapons and ammunition management policies including developing an accountable weapons distribution and tracing system for all Somali security forces, *recognising* that effective weapons and ammunition management is the responsibility of the FGS and FMS, and *encouraging* Somalia's partners to support the FGS and FMS with this, and in line with Somalia's National Security Architecture and the STP,

Condemning the supply of weapons and ammunition to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo, especially when they reach Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to ISIL, and when they undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and *further condemning* continued illegal supply of weapons, ammunition and IED components from Yemen to Somalia,

Condemning Al-Shabaab's terrorist attacks in Somalia and beyond, *expressing* grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through its increased use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and exploitation of the licit financial system, and *further expressing* grave concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL also known as Da'esh),

Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,

Recognising that the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to peace, security and stability in Somalia and the region goes beyond the group's conventional military action and asymmetric warfare, *expressing serious concern* at Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue as documented in the final report of the Panel of Experts (the Panel) on Somalia (S/2021/849) *welcoming* the FGS' efforts to strengthen the Somali Financial Sector to identify and monitor money laundering risks and combat terrorist financing, *noting* the steps set out by the FGS in the STP on institutional capacity building, which seek to develop these capabilities, *noting* the importance of financial services in enabling Somalia's economic future, *further welcoming* efforts by the FGS, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Panel to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab finances, and *urging* engagement from the FGS, FMS, Somali financial institutions, the private sector and the international community to support this process,

Expressing concern at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources in Somalia, *welcoming* efforts made by the FGS to reduce corruption including the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Law on 21 September 2019 and the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission, as well as the ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, *welcoming* progress made by the FGS and FMS in strengthening public financial management and the positive work of the Financial Reporting Centre, and *calling* for the FGS and FMS to continue efforts to address corruption, and to continue to accelerate the pace of reform,

Welcoming measures taken by the FGS, FMS and United Nations Member States with charcoal destination markets to reduce the export of charcoal, *urging* monitoring and control of existing charcoal stockpiles at export points, *encouraging* further development of Somalia's National Policy on Charcoal, which aims to develop the sustainable management of domestic charcoal use, to address disposal of stockpiles,

Expressing concern at the reported ability of Al-Shabaab to exploit the trade in sugar and *urging* the FGS, FMS and regional stakeholders to address this,

Expressing concern at continued reports of illegal and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, *noting* the link between illegal fishing and Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue, *encouraging* the Somali authorities, with support from the international community, to ensure fishing licenses are issued in accordance with the appropriate Somali legislation, *further encouraging* the FGS, FMS and Somali authorities to work with the UNODC, their international partners

and other stakeholders to improve maritime domain awareness and enforcement capabilities,

Expressing concern at the situation in Galmadug, *reiterating* the importance of peaceful dispute resolution both in the run-up to elections in 2021 and beyond, and *reaffirming* the importance of inclusive politics, and democratic elections in ensuring long-term peace and stability in Somalia,

Expressing serious concern at the humanitarian situation in Somalia, noting the combined threat posed by flooding, drought, locust infestation, forced displacement, and COVID-19, and *condemning in the strongest terms* any party obstructing the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance, any misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies, and acts of violence against or harassment of humanitarian workers,

Noting with concern reports, including from the Secretary-General, which document worrying levels of sexual and gender-based violence in Somalia, *further noting* with concern that Somalia remains one of the deadliest conflict areas for children, as outlined in the 2021 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, *further noting* with concern the high levels of recruitment of children in armed conflict in violation of international law and high levels of abductions, with Al-Shabaab continuing to be the main perpetrator, and *urging* the Somali authorities to further strengthen efforts to address these “six grave violations” against children as identified by the Secretary-General, including by implementing measures in line with resolution 2467 (2019),

Reiterating the importance of inclusive dialogue and local reconciliation processes for stability in Somalia, *reaffirming* the importance of both the FGS and FMS engaging in constructive dialogue to de-escalate tensions between them, and *further reiterating* that the successful and peaceful conduct of elections in 2021 as planned and agreed can enable Somalia to refocus on addressing pressing problems, including among other things, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, trafficking of weapons and ammunition, humanitarian needs, floods, drought, and COVID-19 and enable all parties to advance Somalia’s national priorities,

Taking note of the final report of the Panel, *welcoming* the increased cooperation between the Panel and the FGS, and *recalling* that panels of experts operate pursuant to mandates from the Security Council,

Expressing support for the FGS in its efforts to reconstruct the country, counter the threat of terrorism, and stop the trafficking of weapons and ammunition, *further expressing* its intention to ensure the measures in this resolution will enable the FGS in the realisation of these objectives, *noting* that the security situation in Somalia continues to necessitate these measures, including strict controls on the movement of arms but *affirming* that it shall keep the situation in Somalia under constant review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including any modification, possible benchmarks, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed in light of the progress achieved and compliance with this resolution,

Recalling paragraphs 1 to 8 of resolution 2444 (2018), *reaffirming* that it will continue to follow developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti and will support the two countries in the resolution of these matters in good faith,

Underscores its objective in this resolution is to support state- and peace-building in Somalia including by reducing the threat to peace and security posed by Al-Shabaab and by reducing the destabilising impact of Al-Shabaab’s activities, in Somalia and the region, and by supporting Somalia with security sector reforms,

especially weapons and ammunition management, and through the measures and mechanisms outlined in the following operative paragraphs,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

*

Part I: Degrading Al-Shabaab

1. *Reiterates* that Al-Shabaab poses a threat to peace and security, and that its terrorist and other activities have a destabilising impact in Somalia and the region, and *underscores* the need to target Al-Shabaab's finances, improve maritime domain awareness, prevent illicit revenue generation, including from the sale of charcoal, and reduce the threat posed by IEDs;

1a: Targeting illicit finances

2. *Notes with concern* Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources, *calls upon* the FGS to continue working with Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks, improve compliance (including enhanced Know Your Customer and due diligence procedures) and strengthen supervision and enforcement, including through increased reporting to the Central Bank of Somalia and Financial Reporting Centre in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016) as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019), *commends* the FGS for signing a National Identification (ID) bill and *encourages* the development of a unique Somali ID as a matter of priority to improve financial access and compliance and counter the financing of terrorism, *further encourages* support from the international community in addressing these risks and *requests* the FGS, UNODC and the Panel to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's finances and to continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's finances and exploitation of the licit financial system;

3. *Requests* the FGS to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other United Nations Member States, particularly other Member States in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), resolution 2178 (2014), resolution 2462 (2019), and relevant domestic and international law, and *requests* the FGS to submit, in its regular reporting to the Council, an update on specific actions taken by the Somali authorities to counter the financing of terrorism;

1b: Maritime Interdiction and improving maritime domain awareness

4. *Encourages* the UNODC, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, to bring together relevant States and international organisations, including European Naval Force Operation Atalanta, Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and other naval forces in the region to enhance regional cooperation on responding to illicit maritime flows and disrupt all forms of trafficking in licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities in Somalia, and support the FGS and FMS to improve their maritime domain awareness and enforcement, including in relation to the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade;

5. *Decides* to renew and expand the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2022 and *authorises* Member States, acting

nationally or through voluntary multinational naval partnerships such as “Combined Maritime Forces,” in cooperation with the FGS and which the FGS has notified to the Secretary-General and which the Secretary-General has subsequently notified to all Member States, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo on Somalia, the charcoal ban, and the IED components ban, to inspect, without undue delay, in Somali territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia extending to and including the Arabian sea and Persian Gulf, vessels bound to or from Somalia which they have reasonable grounds to believe are:

- (i) carrying charcoal from Somalia in violation of the charcoal ban;
- (ii) carrying weapons or military equipment to Somalia, directly or indirectly, in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia;
- (iii) carrying weapons or military equipment to individuals or entities designated by the Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992); or
- (iv) carrying IED components identified in Part I of Annex C to this resolution in violation of the IED components ban;

Ic: Somalia Charcoal ban

6. *Condemns* any exports of charcoal from Somalia in violation of the total ban on the export of charcoal, *reaffirms* its decision regarding the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012) (“the charcoal ban”), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014);

7. *Welcomes* measures taken by the FGS, FMS and Member States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, *reiterates* its requests that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) support and assist the FGS and FMSs in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia, *encourages* further development of Somalia’s National Policy on Charcoal to develop the sustainable management of domestic charcoal use, *encourages* the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to provide the FGS with data and enhanced analysis on domestic charcoal production to inform the development of the FGS National Policy on Charcoal and *calls upon* AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports;

8. *Reaffirms* the importance of the efforts of the UNODC and its international partners to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia;

Id: IED components restrictions

9. *Noting* the increase in IED attacks undertaken by Al-Shabaab, *decides* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;

10. *Further decides* that, where an item in part I of Annex C to this resolution is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 9, the State shall notify the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and *stresses* the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use of the item(s), the end user, the technical specifications and the quantity of the item(s) to be shipped;

11. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and

firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including inter alia items in part II of Annex C, to keep records of transactions and share information with the FGS, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that the FGS and FMS are provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

12. *Encourages* international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of FGS Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives;

Part 2: supporting state- and peace-building in Somalia

2a: Security sector reform and compliance with international law

13. *Calls upon* the FGS, in coordination with the FMS, to accelerate the implementation of the National Security Architecture and STP, and urges the FGS and FMS to implement the 27 May 2021 roadmap;

14. *Further calls upon* the FGS and FMS to enhance civilian oversight of their security apparatus, to continue to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, and to investigate and, as appropriate, prosecute individuals responsible for violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, and sexual and gender-based violence in conflict and post-conflict situations, and in this context recalls the importance of the Secretary-General's Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to Somali security forces and AMISOM;

15. *Calls upon* the international community to support implementation of the STP to help develop credible, professional and representative Somali security forces;

16. *Calls upon* all parties to the conflict in Somalia to comply with international humanitarian law, and *urges* them to continue conducting prompt and full investigations when reports of civilian casualties resulting from military operations arise;

2b: Weapons and ammunition management and preventing illegal movement of weapons to and within Somalia

17. *Welcomes* progress on weapons and ammunition management and *underlines* the responsibility of the FGS and FMS to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment and their distribution, including implementation of a system which allows tracking of all such military equipment and supplies to the unit level;

18. *Reaffirms* that the FGS, in cooperation with the FMS and AMISOM, shall document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition, photographing all items and relevant markings and facilitating inspection by the Panel of all military items before their redistribution or destruction;

19. *Calls upon* the international community to provide additional and coordinated support to continue to develop the weapons and ammunition management capacity of the FGS and FMS, with a particular focus on training, storage, support for

infrastructure and distribution, technical assistance and capacity building and *encourages* international and regional partners to coordinate their efforts to support the strengthening of FGS bodies in charge of implementing the requirements of this resolution;

20. *Emphasises* that effective weapons and ammunition management will reduce the ability of Al-Shabaab and other armed groups to obtain weapons and reduce the threat to peace and security posed by them, in Somalia and the region, and *reaffirms* that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia, implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, until the Council decides otherwise (as initially imposed by paragraph 5 of its resolution 733 (1992) and paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002), hereafter “the arms embargo”);

21. *Recognises* that Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) and Somali Security Sector Institutions other than those of the FGS (SSSIs) will require access to weapons and specialist equipment, in line with Somalia’s National Security Architecture and the STP, in order to perform their functions effectively and *reaffirms* that the arms embargo shall not apply to:

(a) deliveries of weapons and military equipment, or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of the SNSF, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to items in Annexes A and B to this resolution, which are subject to the applicable approvals and notification procedures as set out in paragraphs 23 and 24 to this resolution;

(b) to deliveries of weapons and military equipment, intended solely for the development of SSSIs, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to items in Annexes A and B to this resolution, which are subject to the applicable approvals and notification procedures as set out in paragraphs 25 and 26 below;

(c) the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of SSSIs, to provide security for the Somali people, which are also subject to the applicable approvals and notification procedures as set out in paragraph 26 below;

22. *Reaffirms* that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with the exemption in paragraph 21 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces or Somali security sector institution to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;

Approvals and notifications required under the arms embargo

23. *Reaffirms* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution, intended solely for the development of SNSF, to provide security for the Somali people, require an advance approval by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, requests for which shall be submitted at least five working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;

24. *Reaffirms* that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution, intended solely for the development of SNSF, to provide security for the Somali people, are subject to notifications to the Committee for information submitted at least five

working days in advance by the FGS or the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering assistance;

25. *Reaffirms* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution, intended solely for the development of SSSIs, to provide security for the Somali people, require an advance approval by the Committee on a case-by-case basis, requests for which shall be submitted at least five working days in advance by the supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation and *requests* States or international, regional and sub-regional organisations to inform the FGS in parallel of any such deliveries at least five working days in advance;

26. *Reaffirms* that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution or the delivery of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of SSSIs, to provide security for the Somali people, may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification from the supplying State or international, regional and sub-regional organisation, and *requests* States or international, regional and sub-regional organisations to inform the FGS in parallel of any such deliveries at least five working days in advance;

27. *Reaffirms* that the delivery of non-lethal military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use shall be notified to the Committee five days in advance for its information only, by the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation;

Further information on approvals and notifications

28. *Reaffirms* that the FGS has the primary responsibility to seek approval from or notify the Committee pursuant to paragraph 23 or 24, as applicable, of any deliveries of weapons and military equipment to the SNSF, at least five days in advance, and that all requests for approvals and notifications should include: details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and military equipment, a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and ammunition, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit in the SNSF, or the intended place of storage;

29. *Reaffirms* that the State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering weapons and military equipment to the SNSF pursuant to paragraph 23 or 24, may alternatively, make an advance request for approval or notification, as applicable, in consultation with the FGS, *reaffirms* that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation choosing to do so should inform the appropriate national coordinating body within the FGS of the advance request for approval or notification and provide the FGS with technical support with notification procedures where appropriate, and *requests* the Committee to transmit advance requests for approval and notifications from States or international, regional or subregional organisations to the appropriate national coordinating body in the FGS;

30. *Reaffirms* that a State or international, regional or subregional organisation delivering any weapon and military equipment, technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities to SSSIs, pursuant to paragraph 25 or 26, has responsibility for seeking approval from or notifying the Committee, as applicable, for any deliveries of those items, advice, assistance or training, and informing the FGS in parallel at least five working days in advance and *decides* that all requests for approvals and notifications should include: details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and military equipment including serial numbers, a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and ammunition, proposed date and place of delivery, and all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit, or the intended place of storage;

31. *Notes with concern* reports that States were not adequately following the notification procedures set out in prior resolutions, *reminds* States of their obligations pursuant to the notification procedures, set out in paragraphs 23–30 above, and *further urges* States to follow strictly the notification procedures for providing assistance to SSSIs including informing the FGS;

32. *Reaffirms* that where paragraphs 23 or 24 apply the FGS shall no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery to the SNSF, including the serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage, and recognises the value of the supplying State or international, regional or subregional organisation doing the same, in cooperation with the FGS;

33. *Decides* that where paragraphs 25 or 26 apply the supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation shall, no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery to the SSSI, including the serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists and the specific place of storage, and inform the FGS in parallel;

Further exemptions to the arms embargo

34. *Reaffirms* that the arms embargo shall not apply to:

(a) Supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of or use by United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM); AMISOM's strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with AMISOM; and the European Union Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia, all as per paragraph 10 (a)–(d) of resolution 2111 (2013);

(b) Supplies of weapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of States or international, regional and subregional organisations undertaking measures to suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, upon the request of the FGS and for which the FGS has notified the Secretary-General, and provided that any measures undertaken shall be consistent with applicable international humanitarian and international human rights law;

(c) Supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

(d) Entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels (as previously affirmed by paragraph 3 of resolution 2244 (2015));

Part 3: Targeted Measures

35. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and its resolutions 2002 (2011), and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and recalls its decisions in its resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018), and *further recalls* that the listing criteria includes, but is not limited to, planning, directing or committing acts involving sexual and gender-based violence, and

reiterates its request for Member States to assist the Panel of Experts in its investigations, and for the FGS, FMS and AMISOM and partners to share information with the Panel of Experts regarding conduct or activities, in particular Al-Shabaab activities, where covered by listing criteria;

36. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011), and *invites* the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate;

37. *Reaffirms* that without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of its resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;

Panel of Experts on Somalia

38. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 December 2022, the Panel on Somalia and that the mandate of the Panel shall include the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018) and paragraph 2 of this resolution, *requests* the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019) and further requests the Panel to include gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting, and *expresses* its intention to review the mandate of the Panel and take appropriate action regarding any extension to the mandate no later than 15 November 2022;

39. *Recalls* the importance of full co-operation between the FGS and the Panel, *requests* the FGS to facilitate for the Panel interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and ISIL held in custody, *notes* the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997, and *requests* the Panel to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the FGS in weapons and ammunition management, including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission;

40. *Reiterates its request* for States, the FGS, the FMS and AMISOM to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations, *urges* the FGS and the FMS to facilitate access for the Panel, on the basis of written requests to the FGS by the Panel, to all FGS armouries in Mogadishu, all FGS-imported weapons and ammunition prior to distribution, all FGS military storage facilities in Somalia National Army (SNA) sectors and all captured weaponry in FGS and FMS custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in FGS and FMS custody and access to all FGS and FMS logbooks and distribution records, in order to enable the Security Council to monitor and assess implementation of this resolution;

Reporting

41. *Requests* the Panel to provide regular updates to the Committee, including a minimum of four different thematic reports delivered on a quarterly basis, including one of smuggling and trafficking on weapons and military equipment, a comprehensive mid-term update and, for the Security Council's consideration,

through the Committee, a final report by 15 October 2022 and *urges* the Panel to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;

42. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than 15 September 2022, and following completion of a technical assessment of Somalia's weapons and ammunition management capability, recommendations to improve it further and to articulate options for clear, well identified, and realistic benchmarks that could serve in guiding the Security Council in its review of the arms embargo measures in light of progress achieved to date and compliance with this resolution, and particularly its consideration of possible modification, suspension or lifting of those measures;

43. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2022 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia;

44. *Requests* the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 1 February 2022 and then by 1 August 2022, including:

(a) the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its security forces, and the status of regional and militia forces,

(i) including as annexes the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014) and para 37 of resolution 2551 (2020), and

(ii) incorporating the notifications regarding the destination unit in the SNSF or the place of storage of military equipment upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition;

(b) an update summarising suspicious activity documented by domestic financial institutions, and investigations and actions undertaken by the Financial Reporting Centre to counter the financing of terrorism and in a manner so as to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information;

(c) an update on the status of individuals designated by the Committee, where information is available;

45. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Security Council with an update, no later than the 31 July 2022 on any further developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti;

46. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Annex A**Items subject to the Committee's advance approval**

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);

2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;

Note: (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);

3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;

4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;

5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel;

6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability;

7. Aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;

Note: "Aircraft" means fixed wing, swivel wing, rotary wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing vehicle, or helicopter.

8. "Vessels" and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;

Note: "Vessel" includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel.

9. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

Annex B**Equipment requiring a notification with regard to deliveries to the Somali National Security Forces and Committee approval for Somalia security sector institutions other than those of the FGS**

- All types of weapons with a calibre up to 12.7mm: and associated ammunition;
- RPG-7 and recoilless rifles, and associated ammunition;
- Helmets manufactured according to military standards or specification, or comparable national standards;
- Body armour or protective garments, as follows:
 - Soft body armour or protective garments, manufactured to military standards or specifications, or their equivalents;
Note: military standards or specifications include, as a minimum, specifications for fragmentation protection.
 - Hard body armour plates providing ballistic protection equal to or greater than level III (NIJ 0101.06 July 2008) or national equivalents;
- Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
- Communication equipment specifically designed or modified for military use;
- Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) positioning equipment, specifically designed or modified for military use.

Annex C**Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components****Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology****Part I**

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
 - b. Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
 - c. Nitroglycerin (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses)
2. Explosive-related goods:
 - a. Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord).
3. “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paras. 1 & 2.

Part II

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
 - b. Nitroglycol;
 - c. Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
 - d. Picryl chloride;
 - e. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT).
2. Explosives precursors:
 - a. Ammonium nitrate;
 - b. Potassium nitrate;
 - c. Sodium chlorate;
 - d. Nitric acid;
 - e. Sulphuric acid.

第 3/2025 號行政長官公告

按照中央人民政府的命令，行政長官根據第3/1999號法律《法規的公佈與格式》第六條第一款的規定，命令公佈聯合國安全理事會於二零二四年十二月十三日通過的關於非洲和平與安全的第2762（2024）號決議的中文和英文正式文本。

二零二五年二月十日發佈。

行政長官 岑浩輝

Aviso do Chefe do Executivo n.º 3/2025

O Chefe do Executivo manda publicar, nos termos do n.º 1 do artigo 6.º da Lei n.º 3/1999 (Publicação e formulário dos diplomas), por ordem do Governo Popular Central, a Resolução n.º 2762 (2024) relativa à paz e segurança em África, adoptada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas em 13 de Dezembro de 2024, nos seus textos autênticos em línguas chinesa e inglesa.

Promulgado em 10 de Fevereiro de 2025.

O Chefe do Executivo, *Sam Hou Fai*.