

Resolution 2707 (2023)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 9473rd meeting, on 14 November 2023

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions and statements of its President concerning Yemen, including resolution 2624 (2022) and 2675 (2023),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Yemen,

Determining that the situation in Yemen continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 15 November 2024 the measures imposed by paragraphs 11 and 15 of resolution 2140 (2014), *reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 of resolution 2140 (2014), and *further reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 14 to 17 of resolution 2216 (2015);

Reporting

2. *Decides* to extend until 15 December 2024 the mandate of the Panel of Experts as set out in paragraph 21 of resolution 2140 (2014), and paragraph 21 of resolution 2216 (2015), *expresses its intention* to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 15 November 2024, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of Experts, in consultation with the Committee until 15 December 2024 drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Panel established pursuant to resolution 2140 (2014);

3. *Requests* the Panel of Experts to provide a midterm update to the Committee no later than 15 April 2024, and a final report including information as set out in paragraph 16 of resolution 2624 (2022) no later than 15 October 2024 to the Security Council, after discussion with the Committee;

4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

第6/2024號行政長官公告

按照中央人民政府的命令，行政長官根據第3/1999號法律《法規的公佈與格式》第六條第一款的規定，命令公佈聯合國安全理事會於二零二三年十二月一日通過的關於非洲和平與安全的第2713（2023）號決議的中文和英文正式文本。

二零二四年一月十七日發佈。

行政長官 賀一誠

Aviso do Chefe do Executivo n.º 6/2024

O Chefe do Executivo manda publicar, nos termos do n.º 1 do artigo 6.º da Lei n.º 3/1999 (Publicação e formulário dos diplomas), por ordem do Governo Popular Central, a Resolução n.º 2713 (2023) relativa à paz e segurança em África, adoptada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas em 1 de Dezembro de 2023, nos seus textos autênticos em línguas chinesa e inglesa.

Promulgado em 17 de Janeiro de 2024.

O Chefe do Executivo, *Ho Iat Seng*.

第 2713 (2023) 號決議

2023 年 12 月 1 日安全理事會第 9490 次會議通過

安全理事會，

回顧其以往關於索馬里局勢的各項決議和主席聲明，

重申尊重索馬里的主權、領土完整、政治獨立和統一，

讚揚索馬里過去十年來，特別是過去兩年在打擊青年黨方面取得的進展，

強調本決議的目的是降低青年黨構成的威脅，

降低青年黨構成的威脅，以及對青年黨實施武器禁運

表示嚴重關切青年黨繼續嚴重威脅索馬里和該區域的和平、安全與穩定，還表示關切與伊黎伊斯蘭國/達伊沙有關聯的分支繼續在索馬里活動，

最強烈地譴責青年黨實施的恐怖主義襲擊，表示深為關切這些襲擊造成的生命損失，還譴責青年黨實行激進化，以追求暴力目標和進行剝削，包括剝削社區錢財，重申安理會決心支持全面努力降低青年黨構成的威脅，

強烈譴責在衝突期間以平民包括人道主義人員為目標和非法攻擊民用物體的行為，以及特別是在人口密集區無差別使用爆炸性武器行為及其對平民造成的後果，促請衝突各方依照國際法，包括國際人道法規定的義務，停止此類做法，

回顧 2023 年秘書長關於兒童與武裝衝突問題的報告 (S/2023/363)，關切地注意到在武裝衝突中違反國際法招募兒童現象和綁架現象嚴重，幾乎所有招募和綁架兒童的案件都是青年黨所為，敦促索馬里聯邦共和國政府以及

索馬里聯邦成員州和地區政府¹進一步加強努力，對付秘書長所確認的“六種嚴重侵害”兒童行為，包括依照第2467（2019）號決議採取措施，

特別指出，必須根據適用的國際法，採取整個政府和整個社會一體聯動的綜合方針，包括讓婦女充分參與，打擊恐怖主義和助長恐怖主義的暴力極端主義，並努力從治理、安全、人權、人道主義、發展和社會經濟等層面應對這個問題，包括青年就業和消除貧困，強調必須開展區域和國際合作打擊恐怖主義、切斷恐怖主義資金來源和非法資金流動以及制止武器販運，

重申不能也不應將恐怖主義與任何宗教、國籍、文明或族裔群體聯繫在一起，譴責恐怖主義團體企圖通過對宗教的歪曲，編造扭曲性言論，為暴力行為辯護，並鼓吹其破壞索馬里和該區域的企圖，表示關切恐怖主義團體利用信息和通信技術，包括通過互聯網特別是社交媒體，從事恐怖主義活動，表示支持聯邦政府再次努力反擊青年黨的言論，

強烈鼓勵會員國與聯邦政府合作，防止青年黨利用社交媒體平台進行犯罪，反擊恐怖主義宣傳，強烈鼓勵聯邦政府制定一項傳播戰略及建立一個宣傳和外聯機制，以便以符合其國際法義務的方式，有系統地反擊青年黨通過視聽和社交媒體發表的言論，

表示嚴重關切索馬里的人道主義局勢，鼓勵各國加大對索馬里的人道主義支持力度，並呼籲衝突各方按照國際法相關規定，包括適用的國際人道法，並以符合聯合國人道主義緊急援助指導原則（聯合國大會第46/182號決議），包括人道、中立、公正和獨立的方式，允許並便利快速、無阻礙地提供必要的人道主義援助，以扶助索馬里各地需要幫助的人，強烈譴責在衝突局勢中以平民包括人道主義人員為目標以及任何非法攻擊民用物體的行為，

¹ 就本決議而言，索馬里聯邦成員州和地區政府是指：加爾穆杜格、希爾謝貝利、朱巴蘭、邦特蘭、西南大區以及貝納迪爾和“索馬里蘭”。

確認索馬里、非洲聯盟和在索馬里境內合法開展行動的其他部隊為打擊青年黨以及將索馬里中部地區從青年黨控制下解放出來，作出了貢獻，而且常常為此付出巨大犧牲，歡迎索馬里和國際社會努力為新解放的社區提供支持和服務以實現穩定，

敦促繼續制定一個由索馬里主導的協調辦法，以發展索馬里海洋治理部門，包括為此組建海上安全工作組，以及為索馬里海事機構提供支持，

關切地**注意到**存在違反安全理事會本決議和以往決議所定措施走私販運武器、軍事裝備和彈藥的現象，敦促聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和會員國採取適當措施，查明走私者並追究其責任，

表示關切專家小組記錄的 MV Fox 號船違反木炭禁令的情況，讚揚專家小組對這一事件進行調查，敦促所有各方就此事與專家小組和聯邦政府進行建設性接觸，提醒所有會員國注意其第 1 號執行援助通知中的規定，

強調安理會通過本決議的目的是根據對索馬里武器和彈藥管理能力的技術評估（S/2022/698 和 S/2023/676），參考索馬里問題專家小組（專家小組）的最後報告（S/2023/724）和聯合國毒品犯罪問題辦公室（毒品和犯罪問題辦公室）的建議，繼續調整其綜合框架，以加強國家建設與和平建設，打敗青年黨，為聯合國索馬里援助團（聯索援助團）、聯合國索馬里支助辦公室（聯索支助辦）和非洲聯盟駐索馬里過渡時期特派團（非索過渡特派團）的任務提供補充，

確認青年黨對索馬里的和平與安全構成威脅，其恐怖活動和其他活動對該區域的安全構成威脅，特別指出需要通過定向制裁、防止取得武器彈藥、切斷資金來源、降低簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅、加強海上態勢感知以及開展國際協作，從而削弱青年黨的實力，

確認需要不斷加強正當程序，確保有公正而明確的程序用於把根據經修正

的第1844（2008）號決議指認的個人和實體從名單上刪除，

認定青年黨通過包括恐怖主義行為等方式企圖破壞索馬里和該區域的和平與安全，對國際和平與安全構成威脅，

根據《聯合國憲章》第七章**採取行動**，

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A. 定向制裁

1. **回顧**安理會第1844（2008）、2002（2011）、2093（2013）和2662（2022）號決議各項決定，其中第1844（2008）號決議規定實施定向制裁，第2002（2011）、2093（2013）和2662（2022）號決議擴大了列名標準，並回顧第2060（2012）和2444（2018）號決議各項決定；

2. **表示**打算支持進一步制定公平而明確的程序，用於把根據經修訂的第1844（2008）號決議指認的個人和實體從名單上刪除；

3. **回顧**第2664（2022）號決議，其中規定了對資產凍結措施、包括第1844（2008）號決議第3段所定措施的跨領域人道主義豁免，取代和替換第2662（2022）號決議第28段中與索馬里有關的人道主義豁免；

B. 對青年黨的武器禁運

4. **決定**，為防止青年黨和其他意圖破壞索馬里和該區域和平與安全的行為體獲取武器彈藥，所有國家都應採取必要措施，防止向索馬里運送任何武器、彈藥和軍事裝備，包括禁止為一切購置和運送武器、彈藥和軍事裝備提供資金，還決定，這些措施不適用於向聯邦政府、索馬里國民軍、國家情報與安全局、索馬里國家警察部隊和索馬里看守部隊運送或提供的物資；

5. **表示注意到**最近對青年黨採取的軍事行動，鼓勵聯邦政府和索馬里聯邦成員州及地區政府在合作夥伴的適當支持下，對所繳獲或查扣的所有青年

黨武器、彈藥和軍事裝備進行登記，並在專家小組的必要協助下，調查其來源；

6. **申明**聯邦政府應與非索過渡特派團合作，記錄和登記在進攻行動中或執行任務過程中從青年黨繳獲的所有武器、彈藥和軍事裝備，包括：

- a. 記錄武器和（或）彈藥的類型、批次和序列號；
- b. 對所有物項和相關標識和（或）字樣進行拍照；
- c. 協助專家小組進行檢查所有繳獲武器彈藥和軍用物項，其後再進行重新分配或銷毀；

7. **促請**會員國採取合理步驟防止向索馬里走私武器和彈藥；

C. 切斷青年黨的資金來源

8. 關切地**注意到**青年黨有能力創收和洗錢、儲存和轉移資源，以實施恐怖主義以及破壞索馬里和該區域的穩定，請聯邦政府酌情與國際夥伴合作，繼續制定一項全面計劃，扼制青年黨的活動；

9. **促請**聯邦政府繼續與聯邦成員州、索馬里金融管理局、私營部門金融機構和國際社會合作，以便：

- a. 通過改進反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為的標準及法律、監管和體制框架，確定、評估和減輕洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為風險；
- b. 改進合規，包括強化“了解客戶”和盡職調查程序；
- c. 按照《反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為法》（2016年）以及《移動貨幣條例》（2019年）和金融行動特別工作組相關建議加強監管和執法，鼓勵與電信部門開展協作以減少青年黨利用移動貨幣的風險；
- d. 在2024年運用索馬里的中東和北非金融行動特別工作組互評，處理

與恐怖主義融資和洗錢風險有關的優先領域問題；

e. 優先繼續開發一個安全、包容、能改善金融准入的國家身份識別系統，同時打擊資助恐怖主義行為；

f. 根據《反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為法》（2016）的要求，改進對洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為的監測、報告和調查；

g. 制定一項計劃，以降低青年黨對國家主管當局和私營部門內從事反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為工作人員構成的風險，並制定一項計劃，以保護那些提供與青年黨勒索手段有關信息的人；

10. **促請**聯邦政府改進監管和執法機構之間的合作與協調，採取協調一致的聯合辦法調查資助恐怖主義行為，並實施阻斷資金戰略以扼制青年黨融資和阻止其不當利用合法金融系統；

11. **請**聯邦政府、毒品和犯罪問題辦公室和專家小組繼續交換有關青年黨活動的信息，並繼續與利益攸關方合作制定扼制青年黨活動和阻止其不當利用合法金融系統的計劃；

12. **注意到**毒品和犯罪問題辦公室在最後確定和執行《強化機構間合作以打擊非法貿易和消除其影響路線圖》草案方面發揮的協調作用，鼓勵索馬里與毒品和犯罪問題辦公室合作制定一項計劃，以阻斷使青年黨得以從中獲利的非法貿易；

13. **歡迎**開展區域和國際合作，以降低青年黨構成的威脅，鼓勵繼續在區域和國際層面開展合作，以應對青年黨對索馬里和該區域構成的威脅，並鼓勵與聯合國反恐怖主義辦公室內羅畢辦事處開展國際合作，支持區域各國努力打擊恐怖主義和助長恐怖主義的暴力極端主義；

D. 木炭禁令

14. **重申**安理會第 2036 (2012) 號決議第 22 段和第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 11 至 21 段所述關於禁止索馬里木炭進出口的決定；

15. **歡迎**聯邦政府、聯邦成員州和各會員國為減少索馬里木炭出口而採取的措施，再次請非索過渡特派團支持和協助索馬里執行木炭禁令，並為專家小組定期走訪出口木炭的港口提供便利，重申毒品和犯罪問題辦公室及其國際夥伴必須努力監測和阻斷索馬里木炭進出口；

16. **回顧**第 2662 (2022) 號決議第 36 段，歡迎合作為處置基斯馬尤及其周圍木炭庫存制定一項計劃，鼓勵索馬里酌情在其他夥伴的支持下，繼續確保可持續管理國內木炭生產；

17. **回顧**安理會第 2696 (2023) 號決議中決定授權一次性處置基斯馬尤及其周圍的木炭庫存，並要求：

a. 專家小組及毒品和犯罪問題辦公室繼續監測木炭庫存及其流動情況，以確保不會因徹底處置木炭庫存而引發木炭非法生產；

b. 聯邦政府在整個處置過程中繼續與委員會互動接觸，包括分享處置過程結束後生成的最後資金記錄；

E. 降低簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅

18. **重申**，如果有足夠證據表明本決議附件 C 第一部分所列物項將用於或非常有可能用於在索馬里製造簡易爆炸裝置，所有國家應防止所涉物項從本國領土或由境外本國國民或使用懸掛本國國旗的船隻或飛機直接或間接向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓；

19. **決定**：

a. 在向索馬里轉讓附件 C 第一部分所列任何物項之前，供應物項的會

員國應通知索馬里政府，讓其知悉；

b. 如果根據第 19 段向索馬里直接或間接出售、供應或轉讓本決議附件 C 第一部分所列物項，相關國家應在出售、供應或轉讓完成後不超過 15 個工作日通知聯邦政府，讓其知悉，並且通知委員會，強調指出，根據本段發出的通知必須列入所有相關信息，包括：

- (一) 物項的使用目的；
- (二) 最終用戶；
- (三) 技術規格；
- (四) 物項數目；以及
- (五) 預定儲存地點；

20. **鼓勵**聯邦政府實施適當立法，對附件 C 第一和第二部分所列物項的進口和過境進行規範和監測，並促請會員國支持聯邦政府實現這一目標；

21. **促請**會員國採取適當措施，推動那些參與向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓可能用於製造簡易爆炸裝置的炸藥前體或材料（除其他外包括附件 C 第二部分所列物項）的本國國民、受本國管轄者和在本國領土註冊公司或受本國管轄的公司保持警惕，記錄交易，並與索馬里、委員會和專家小組分享關於索馬里人購買或打探此類化學品的可疑活動信息，確保索馬里得到適足的財政和技術援助，用於為此類材料的儲存和分配建立適當的安全保障；

22. **鼓勵**索馬里的國際和區域合作夥伴為爆炸物處理單位開展持續專業培訓，提供適當的設備並協調支持，使索馬里更有能力分析爆炸物以及追蹤簡易爆炸裝置及其部件來源和保管鏈；

F. 海上攔截和海事領域認知

23. **決定**將第 2182(2014)號決議第 15 和 17 段所述、並經第 2607(2021)號決議第 5 段擴大以涵蓋簡易爆炸裝置部件的各項規定續延至 2024 年 12 月 15 日；

24. **鼓勵**毒品和犯罪問題辦公室在其當前任務授權範圍內，並在海上犯罪問題印度洋論壇框架下，通過以下方式支持聯邦政府打擊青年黨：

a. 召集有關會員國和國際組織加強區域合作，應對非法海上流動，阻斷可能為索馬里境內恐怖主義活動提供資金的各種形式合法和非法貨物販運；

b. 支持索馬里提高海上態勢感知，加強執法，包括提高對漁船在販運和非法貿易中作用的認識並加強相關執法；

c. 支持聯邦政府實施漁業保護和執法能力示範項目；

d. 通過擴大港口執法和打擊走私方面的能力建設，支持聯邦政府；

e. 與航運協會代表接觸，討論使這些措施更易於實行的可能方式，並在 2024 年提交委員會的下一期通報中提出建議；

G. 專家小組和安全理事會委員會

25. **決定**續設專家小組，任期從本決議通過之日起至 2025 年 1 月 15 日，此後稱第 2713(2023)號決議所設專家小組，並決定專家小組的任務應包括第 2444(2018)號決議第 11 段及本決議第 5、11 和 17 段提及的任務，請秘書長根據安理會第 2467(2019)號決議第 11 段在專家小組中包括具備性別問題專門能力的成員，還請專家小組將性別平等作為貫穿各領域的問題納入各項調查和報告，表示打算不遲於 2024 年 12 月 15 日審查這一任務，並就是否延長和修改這一任務採取適當行動；

26. **回顧**會員國與專家小組充分合作的重要性，請聯邦政府協助專家小組

對被拘留的青年黨嫌疑成員和其他涉案人進行訪談，指出專家小組根據 S/2006/997 號文件執行任務的重要性，請專家小組向委員會提出關於如何支持聯邦政府管理武器彈藥以及減少武器彈藥走私的建議，包括努力設立國家輕小武器委員會，以及按照 S/2023/676 所述對付衝突中性暴力和“六種嚴重侵害”兒童行為；

27. **再次請**聯邦政府、索馬里聯邦成員州和地區政府、會員國和非索過渡特派團向專家小組提供信息，協助專家小組開展調查，並且：

a. 請聯邦政府根據專家小組向其提出的書面請求，為專家組提供便利，讓其查看軍械庫、進口的武器彈藥、索馬里國民軍各區的軍事儲存設施以及索馬里保管的收繳武器，並允許對索馬里保管的武器彈藥進行拍照以及查閱航行日誌和分發記錄；

b. 鼓勵專家小組就 27.a 段內容與中央監測部密切協調；

c. 敦促聯邦政府、聯邦成員州、非索過渡特派團及其合作夥伴與專家小組分享與青年黨和其他意圖破壞索馬里和該區域和平與安全的行為體的行為或活動有關的信息，特別是資金、武器、彈藥和軍事裝備非法流動的信息，如果所涉行為或活動屬於定向制裁列名標準的範圍；

28. **請**負責兒童與武裝衝突問題秘書長特別代表和負責衝突中性暴力問題特別代表根據第 1960（2010）號決議第 7 段和第 1998（2011）號決議第 9 段與聯邦政府和委員會分享相關信息，並邀請聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處酌情與聯邦政府和委員會分享相關信息；

29. **請**專家小組提供：

a. 酌情與被任命協助其他制裁委員會工作的獨立專家合作，定期向委員會通報最新情況，包括至少三份不同專題報告；

b. 全面通報中期最新情況；

c. 至遲於 2024 年 10 月 15 日通過委員會提交最後報告，供安全理事會審議；

敦促專家小組就其報告所載結論徵求委員會的反饋意見；

30. **請**緊急救濟協調員至遲於 2024 年 10 月 15 日通報關於在索馬里提供人道主義援助以及提供人道主義援助所遇任何障礙的最新情況；請毒品和犯罪問題辦公室至遲於 2024 年 10 月 15 日通報其與本決議有關工作的最新情況；

31. **決定**委員會主席今後應每年向安全理事會通報情況，以配合最近一次定於 2024 年 12 月 15 日前舉行的索馬里問題會議，還決定委員會此後不再稱為“第 751 (1992) 號決議所設”，而應稱為“第 2713 (2023) 號決議所設”；

H. 防止青年黨獲得武器、彈藥和軍事裝備

32. **鼓勵**聯邦政府與委員會分享將獲准進口靜態和移動保護所需武器、彈藥以及軍事裝備的索馬里境內持證私營保安公司名單；

33. **申明**第 4 段不適用於僅供支持下列實體或供其使用的武器、彈藥或軍事裝備：

- a. 聯邦政府；
- b. 索馬里國民軍；
- c. 國家情報與安全局；
- d. 國家警察部隊；
- e. 索馬里看守部隊；

34. **決定**第 4 段不適用於僅供支持下列人員和活動或供其使用的武器、彈藥或軍事裝備：

a. 聯合國人員，包括聯索援助團和聯索支助辦；

b. 非索過渡特派團及其部隊和警察派遣國以及僅在非洲聯盟最新戰略行動構想下並與非索過渡特派團協調合作開展工作的非索過渡特派團戰略夥伴；

c. 歐洲聯盟培訓和支助活動、土耳其、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國和美利堅合眾國，以及與聯邦政府訂有部隊地位協定或諒解備忘錄的任何其他會員國部隊，但它們須告知委員會存在此種協定，進行報備；

35. **決定**第 4 段不適用於僅供支持下列實體或供其使用的武器、彈藥或軍事裝備：

a. 索馬里聯邦成員州和地區政府；或

b. 索馬里境內持證私營保安公司；

但本決議附件 A 和 B 所列物項除外，那些物項須遵循本決議第 36 和 37 段規定的程序；

36. **決定**，決定，如果委員會在接到聯邦政府通知後五個工作日內未作出反對決定，則可向聯邦成員州和地區政府，或向索馬里境內從事業務的持證私營保安公司運送本決議附件 A 所列物項，以便為索馬里境內國際和商業房地及人員提供安保；

37. **決定**，在向聯邦成員州和地區政府或向索馬里境內從事業務的持證私營保安公司運送本決議附件 B 所列物項，以便為索馬里境內國際和商業房地及人員提供安保之前，須由聯邦政府提前至少五個工作日通知委員會，進行報備；

38. **決定**所有報備內容均應包括：
- a. 武器彈藥和軍事裝備的生產商和供應商的詳細情況，包括類型、批/次和序列號；
 - b. 武器彈藥的說明，包括類別、口徑和數量；
 - c. 擬議的交付日期和地點；
 - d. 與預定收貨單位或預定存放地點相關的所有信息；
39. **決定**，在適用第 36 或 37 段規定的情況下，聯邦政府應不遲於武器彈藥和軍事裝備運送後 30 天向委員會提交確認已完成交付的交付後書面通知，進行報備，內容包括所運送武器和軍事裝備的類型、批/次和序列號、運輸信息、提單、貨物清單或裝箱單、預定最終用戶和具體存放地點；
40. **申明**聯邦政府負有首要責任，需依照第 36 和 37 段告知委員會向索馬里運送武器彈藥和軍事裝備的任何情況，強調所有可能向索馬里提供武器彈藥的供應商都應與聯邦政府協商；
41. **申明**，為進一步避免青年黨獲得武器和彈藥，不得將根據本決議第 33、34 和 35 段出售或供應的武器、彈藥和軍事裝備轉售、轉讓或提供給任何並非為最初出售或供應對象，或並非為出售國或供應國服務，或並非為國際、區域或次區域組織服務的個人或實體，請委員會與索馬里的適當國家協調機構（國家安全辦公室）分享提交給委員會的與第 36、37 和 39 段有關的所有通知，供其參考；
42. **請**秘書處在其現有資源範圍內支持聯邦政府開展與武器彈藥和相關物資管制有關的宣傳工作，必要時使用當地語言；
43. **申明**致力於與索馬里合作確保繼續逐步解除本決議及附件 A 和 B 所定程序，而且安理會將不斷審查有關局勢，準備根據所取得的進展和對該決

議的遵守情況，審查本決議所列措施是否得當，包括視需要修改、暫停或解除這些措施；

44. **決定**，第 4 段不適用於：

a. 由聯合國人員、媒體代表、私營保安承包商以及人道主義和發展工作者及相關人員臨時出口到索馬里、僅供個人使用的防護服，包括防彈背心和軍用頭盔；

b. 國家或國際、區域或次區域組織僅為人道主義或保護目的運送非致命性軍事裝備；

c. 運載防衛用途武器和軍事裝備的船隻在索馬里港口臨時停靠，前提是此類物項必須始終留在船上；

I. 報告

45. **要求**向安全理事會提交以下報告：

a. 聯邦政府酌情與索馬里聯邦成員州和地區政府協調合作，包括通過國家安全架構各機構進行協調合作，根據第 2182（2014）號決議第 9 段並按照第 2244（2015）號決議第 7 段的要求，至遲於 2024 年 5 月 1 日、其後至遲於 2024 年 10 月 1 日提交報告，內容包括：

（一） 說明索馬里的安全和警察機構、地區部隊和民兵部隊的現況以及現有為確保武器、彈藥和軍事裝備的安全儲存、登記、維護和分發而建立的基礎設施，並說明這方面的任何能力建設需求；

（二） 說明登記、分發、使用和儲存武器的現行程序和行為守則以及這方面的任何能力建設需求；

（三） 報告所述期間進口的武器、彈藥和軍事裝備綜合清單，包括：製造商、類型、口徑、批次和序列號；

(四) 附有第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 7 段和第 2551 (2020) 號決議第 37 段所要求的聯合核查小組報告；

(五) 概述國內金融機構記錄的可疑活動以及金融報告中心為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而開展的調查和採取的行動最新情況，同時應保護敏感信息的機密性；

(六) 關於索馬里政府當局為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而採取具體行動的最新情況；

b. 秘書長應當：

(一) 至遲於 2024 年 10 月 15 日對照技術評估報告 (S/2022/698) 所載基準中的每項指標，提供最新進展情況，並要求將這一評估：

1. 在可行情況下擴展到索馬里所有地區，並且酌情提出具體建議和基準；

2. 增訂一個關於簡易爆炸裝置製造和處置所涉化學前體安全管理的基準；

c. 本決議第 34.c 段所列或隨後增列的組織和國家至遲於 2024 年 11 月 15 日通報自本決議通過以來向索馬里提供支持的最新情況，以及報告所述期間進口的武器、彈藥和軍事裝備綜合清單，包括：製造商、類型、口徑、批次和序列號；

46. **鼓勵**反恐怖主義委員會執行局(反恐執行局)，包括借助“技術反恐”等舉措，支持聯邦政府分析和報告青年黨利用在線平台從事恐怖主義活動的情況，並與該區域會員國合作，促進在發現和制止青年黨恐怖活動方面進行能力建設；

47. **決定**繼續積極處理此案。

附件 A

須經無異議程序的物項*

1. 地對空導彈，包括便攜式防空導彈系統（肩扛式防空導彈）；
2. 口徑大於 12.7 毫米的武器和專門為這些武器設計的部件，以及相關彈藥；
 - a. 註：（這不包括肩射反坦克火箭發射器，例如火箭榴彈或輕型反坦克武器、無後坐力炮、槍榴彈或榴彈發射器。）；
3. 口徑大於 82 毫米的迫擊炮及相關彈藥；
4. 反坦克制導武器，包括反坦克制導導彈和彈藥以及專門為這些物項設計的部件；
5. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的火藥和裝置；地雷和相關材料；引信；
6. 有夜視功能（包括熱成像和紅外線）的武器瞄準具以及配件；
7. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的固定翼、轉動翼、傾斜旋翼或傾斜翼飛機；
8. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的“載體”和兩棲車輛；
 - a. 註：“載體”包括任何船舶、表面效應運載工具、小水平面積的船隻或水翼船以及船隻的船體或船體一部分；
9. 無人駕駛作戰飛機（在聯合國常規武器登記冊中列為第四類）。

* （不適用於索馬里聯邦共和國政府、索馬里國民軍、索馬里國家情報與安全局、索馬里國家警察部隊和索馬里看守部隊）。

附件 B

需要預先通知的物項（僅供報備）*

1. 口徑最大達 12.7 毫米的所有類型武器及相關彈藥；
2. RPG-7 火箭筒、LAW（輕型反坦克武器）和無後坐力炮以及相關彈藥；
3. 武器瞄準具；
4. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的旋轉翼飛行器或直升機；
5. 防彈服或防護服，如下：
 - a. 提供等於或大於 III 級標準（美國國家司法研究所 NIJ0101.06 標準，2008 年 7 月）或國家等同標準的防彈保護的硬防彈服；
6. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的陸地車輛；
7. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的通信設備。

*（不適用於索馬里聯邦共和國政府、索馬里國民軍、索馬里國家情報與安全局、索馬里國家警察部隊和索馬里看守部隊）。

附件 C

簡易爆炸裝置組件

爆炸材料、炸藥前體、爆炸相關設備和相關技術

第一部分*

1. 下列爆炸材料和前體以及含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料和前體的混合物：

- a. 硝化棉（含氮量大於 12.5%w/w）；
- b. 三硝基苯基甲硝胺；
- c. 硝酸甘油（但按藥用劑量單個包裝/配製的情況除外）；
- d. 硫酸；
- e. 硝酸；

2. 爆炸相關物品：

- a. 專門設計用於通過電氣或非電氣方式引爆炸藥的設備和裝置（例如點火裝置、引爆裝置、點火器、導爆索）；
- b. 第 1 和 2.a 段所列物項的“生產”或“使用”所需“技術”；

第二部分

1. 下列爆炸材料以及含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料的混合物：

- a. 硝銨燃油炸藥（銨油炸藥）；

* 在計劃裝運前通知索馬里聯邦共和國政府。

- b. 硝酸乙二醇；
 - c. 季戎四醇四硝酸酯；
 - d. 氯化吡咯；
 - e. 三硝基甲苯（梯恩梯）；
2. 炸藥前體：
- a. 硝酸銨；
 - b. 硝酸鉀；
 - c. 氯酸鈉；
3. 專家小組認定的雙重用途物項：
- a. 帶有擾動傳感器的警報系統，包括摩托車警報器；
 - b. 學習代碼接收器。

Resolution 2713 (2023)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 9490th meeting, on 1 December 2023

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Commending the progress made in Somalia over the past ten years, and especially over the past two years in the fight against Al-Shabaab,

Emphasising that the purpose of this resolution is to degrade the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

Degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and the Arms Embargo on Al-Shabaab

Expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and further expressing concern about the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh,

Condemning in the strongest possible terms Al-Shabaab's terrorist attacks, expressing deep concern at the loss of life from these attacks, further condemning Al-Shabaab's radicalisation to violent ends and exploitation, including financially of communities, and reiterating its determination to support comprehensive efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab,

Strongly condemning the targeting of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and any unlawful attacks against civilian objects in situations of conflict, as well as the indiscriminate use of explosive weapons, in particular in densely populated areas, and the consequences for the civilian population, and calling upon all parties to the conflict to cease such practices in accordance with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law,

Recalling the 2023 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict (S/2023/363), and noting with concern the high levels of recruitment of children in armed conflict in violation of international law and high levels of abductions, with Al-Shabaab responsible for almost all cases of child recruitment and abduction of children, and urging the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia

(GFRS), and Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS) and regional governments,¹ to further strengthen efforts to address the "six grave violations" against children as identified by the Secretary-General, including by implementing measures in line with resolution 2467 (2019),

Underscoring the importance of a holistic, whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, including the full participation of women, to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, human rights, humanitarian, development and socioeconomic dimensions of the problem, including youth employment and eradication of poverty, and emphasising the importance of regional and international cooperation to counter terrorism, disrupt terrorist finances and illicit financial flows, and stop arms trafficking,

Reiterating that terrorism cannot, and should not, be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group, condemning terrorist groups' attempts to craft distorted narratives that are based on misrepresentation of religion to justify violence and to popularise their attempts to undermine Somalia and the region, expressing concern over their exploitation of information and communication technologies including through the Internet, particularly social media, for terrorist purposes, and supporting the GFRS's renewed efforts to counter Al-Shabaab's narratives,

Strongly encouraging Member States to work with the GFRS to prevent Al-Shabaab from using social media platforms for criminal purposes and to counter terrorist propaganda, and strongly encouraging the GFRS to develop a communication strategy and a publicity and outreach mechanism to systematically counter the narratives of Al-Shabaab through audio-visual and social media in a manner consistent with their obligations under international law,

Expressing serious concern about the humanitarian situation in Somalia, encouraging States to scale-up their humanitarian support to Somalia, and calling for all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and in a manner consistent with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance (United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182), including humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, the rapid and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance necessary to support persons in need across Somalia,

Recognising the contribution of Somali, African Union, and other forces operating legally in Somalia towards combatting Al-Shabaab, often at great sacrifice, and liberating areas of central Somalia from control by the group, and welcoming Somali and international efforts to bring stabilisation support and services to newly liberated communities,

Urging continued development of a Somalia-led, coordinated approach in developing Somalia's maritime governance sector, including through the formation of the Maritime Security Working Group, and support of Somalia's maritime institutions,

Noting with concern smuggling and trafficking of weapons, military equipment and ammunition in contravention of the measures imposed by the Security Council in this and previous resolutions, and urging the GFRS, FMS and Member States to take appropriate measures to identify smugglers and hold them accountable,

¹ For the purposes of this resolution Somalia's Federal Member States and regional governments are: Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, South West, and Banadir and "Somaliland".

Expressing concern about the violation of the charcoal ban by the vessel MV Fox documented by the Panel, commending the Panel's investigations into this incident, urging all parties to engage constructively with the Panel and the GFRS on this matter, and reminding all Member States of the provisions in its Implementation Assistance Notice No. 1,

Emphasising that its objective, through this resolution, is to continue to update its consolidated framework – drawing on the technical assessments of Somalia's weapons and ammunition management capability (S/2022/698 and S/2023/676), and taking note of the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia (Panel) (S/2023/724) and recommendations from the United Nations Office on Drugs Crime (UNODC) – to strengthen state- and peace-building, defeat Al-Shabaab and complement the mandates of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS),

Recognising that Al-Shabaab poses a threat to peace and security in Somalia, and that its terrorist and other activities pose a security threat to the region, and underscoring the need to degrade Al-Shabaab through: targeted sanctions, preventing access to weapons and ammunition, disrupting its finances, reducing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, improving maritime domain awareness and through international collaboration,

Recognising the need to continuously strengthen due process and to ensure that fair and clear procedures exist for delisting individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) as amended,

Determining that Al-Shabaab's attempts to undermine peace and security in Somalia and the region, including through acts of terrorism, constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

*

A. Targeted sanctions

1. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008), which imposed targeted sanctions, and its resolutions 2002 (2011), 2093 (2013) and 2662 (2022), which expanded the listing criteria, and recalls its decisions in resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018);

2. *Expresses* its intention to support the further development of fair and clear procedures for the delisting of individuals and entities designated pursuant to resolution 1844 (2008) as amended;

3. *Recalls* resolution 2664 (2022), which established a cross-cutting humanitarian exemption to asset freeze measures, including those imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008), supersedes and replaces the humanitarian exemption relating to Somalia in paragraph 28 of resolution 2662 (2022);

B. Arms embargo on Al-Shabaab

4. *Decides* that all States shall, for the purposes of preventing Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region from obtaining weapons and ammunition, take the necessary measures to prevent all deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Somalia, including

prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and further decides that these measures shall not apply to deliveries or supplies to the GFRS, the Somali National Army (SNA), the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), the Somali National Police Force (SNPF) and the Somali Custodial Corps;

5. *Takes note* of the recent military operations against Al-Shabaab and encourages the GFRS and Somalia's FMS and regional governments, with the support of partners as appropriate, to register all weapons, ammunition and military equipment captured or seized from Al-Shabaab and, with the assistance of the Panel as necessary, to investigate their origin;

6. *Affirms* that the GFRS, in cooperation with ATMIS, shall document and register all weapons, ammunition and military equipment, captured from Al-Shabaab as part of offensive operations, or in the course of carrying out their mandate, including:

a. recording the type, lot/batch and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition;

b. photographing all items and relevant markings and/or headstamps;

c. facilitating inspection by the Panel of all captured weapons, ammunition and military items before their redistribution or destruction;

7. *Calls on* Member States to take reasonable steps to prevent smuggling of weapons and ammunition into Somalia;

C. Disrupting Al-Shabaab's finances

8. *Notes* with concern Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources to carry out terrorism and destabilise Somalia and the region, and requests the GFRS, working with international partners as appropriate, to continue to develop a comprehensive plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's operations;

9. *Calls upon* the GFRS to continue working with the FMS, Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to:

a. identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks by improving anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism standards, legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks;

b. improve compliance, including Know Your Customer and customer due diligence procedures;

c. strengthen supervision and enforcement, in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016), as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019) and relevant Financial Action Task Force recommendations, and encourages collaboration with the telecoms sector to reduce the risk of exploitation of the mobile money sector by Al-Shabaab;

d. use Somalia's Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation in 2024 to address priority areas relating to terrorist financing and money laundering risks;

e. prioritise the continued development of a secure and inclusive, national identification system that improves financial access while countering the financing of terrorism;

f. improve monitoring, reporting and investigations into money laundering and terrorist financing as required under the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016); and,

g. develop a plan to mitigate the risks posed by Al-Shabaab to personnel working in anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing roles within national competent authorities and the private sector, and a plan to protect those who share information relating to Al-Shabaab's extortion tactics;

10. *Calls upon* the GFRS to improve collaboration and coordination among regulatory and law enforcement agencies and undertake coordinated and joint approaches to terrorist finance investigations and implement disruption strategies to counter-Al-Shabaab's finances and its exploitation of the licit financial system;

11. *Requests* the GFRS, UNODC and the Panel to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's operations and to continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's operations and exploitation of the licit financial system;

12. *Notes* UNODC's coordination role in finalising and implementing the draft Roadmap for Enhanced Inter-Agency Cooperation to Combat Illicit Trade and its Effects, and encourages Somalia to work with UNODC to develop a plan to disrupt all illicit trade from which Al-Shabaab profits;

13. *Welcomes* regional and international cooperation to degrade the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and encourages continued cooperation at the regional and international level to address the threat posed by Al-Shabaab to Somalia and the region, and encourages international cooperation with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism Programme Office in Nairobi in its support for regional countries in their efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;

D. Charcoal Ban

14. *Reaffirms* its decision to ban the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014);

15. *Welcomes* measures taken by the GFRS, FMS and Member States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, reiterates its requests that ATMIS support and assist Somalia in implementing the charcoal ban, and facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports, and reaffirms the importance of the efforts of the UNODC and its international partners to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia;

16. *Recalls* paragraph 36 of resolution 2662 (2022), and welcomes the collaborative development of a plan to dispose of the charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo and encourages Somalia to continue to ensure the sustainable management of domestic charcoal production, with support from other partners, as appropriate;

17. *Recalls* its decision in resolution 2696 (2023) to authorise a one-off disposal of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo, and requests:

a. the Panel and UNODC to continue to monitor the charcoal stockpiles and their movement to ensure the complete disposal does not trigger illicit production of charcoal; and,

b. the GFRS to continue to engage with the Committee throughout the disposal process, including sharing a final record of funds generated upon completion of the disposal process;

E. Reducing the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

18. *Reaffirms* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;

19. *Decides* that:

a. prior to transferring any items in Part I of Annex C to Somalia, the supplying Member State of the items should notify the GFRS for its awareness;

b. where an item in part I of Annex C to this resolution is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 19, the State shall notify the GFRS for its awareness and the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and stresses the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including:

- i. purpose of the use of the item(s);
- ii. end user;
- iii. technical specifications;
- iv. quantity of the item(s); and
- v. intended storage location;

20. *Encourages* the GFRS to implement appropriate legislation to regulate and monitor the import and transit of items listed in parts I and II of Annex C, and calls upon Member States to support the GFRS in this objective;

21. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including, among other things, items in part II of Annex C, to keep records of transactions and share information with Somalia, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that Somalia is provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

22. *Encourages* international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives and tracing the origin and chain of custody of IEDs and their components;

F. Maritime interdiction and maritime domain awareness

23. *Decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 2182 (2014), and expanded by paragraph 5 of resolution 2607 (2021) to cover IED components, until 15 December 2024;

24. *Encourages* the UNODC, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, to support the GFRS to counter Al-Shabaab by:

a. bringing together relevant Member States and international organisations to enhance regional cooperation on responding to illicit maritime flows and disrupt all forms of trafficking in licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities;

b. supporting Somalia to improve their maritime domain awareness and enforcement, including in relation to the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade;

c. supporting the GFRS with fisheries protection and its enforcement capability demonstrator project;

d. supporting the GFRS by extending capacity building on law enforcement and counter-smuggling at ports; and,

e. engaging with shipping association representatives to discuss possible ways to make these measures more implementable and propose recommendations in its next briefing to the Committee in 2024;

G. Panel of Experts and Security Council Committee

25. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 January 2025, the Panel, to henceforth be known as the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023), and that their mandate shall include the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018), paragraphs 5, 11 and 17 to this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019) and further requests the Panel to include gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting, and expresses its intention to review this mandate and take appropriate action regarding any extension and modification of this mandate, no later than 15 December 2024;

26. *Recalls* the importance of full co-operation between Member States and the Panel, requests the GFRS to facilitate for the Panel interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, notes the importance of the Panel carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997, and requests the Panel to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the GFRS in weapons and ammunition management and reduce smuggling of weapons and ammunition, including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission and address sexual violence in conflict and the “six grave violations” against children, in line with S/2023/676;

27. *Reiterates* its request for the GFRS, Somalia’s FMS and regional governments, Member States, and ATMIS to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations; and,

a. requests the GFRS to facilitate, on the basis of written requests to the GFRS by the Panel, access for the Panel to armouries, imported weapons and ammunition, military storage facilities in SNA sectors and captured weaponry in Somali custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in Somali custody and access to logbooks and distribution records;

- b. encourages the Panel to coordinate closely with the CMD on 27.a;
- c. urges the GFRS, FMS, ATMIS and partners to share information with the Panel regarding conduct or activities, in particular on illicit flows of finances, weapons, ammunition and military equipment by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region, where covered by listing criteria for targeted sanctions;

28. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011), and invites the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the GFRS and the Committee, as appropriate;

29. *Requests* the Panel to provide:

- a. regular updates to the Committee, in collaboration with independent experts appointed to help the work of other sanctions committees if appropriate, including a minimum of three different thematic reports;

- b. a comprehensive mid-term update; and

- c. for the Security Council's consideration through the Committee a final report by 15 October 2024;

and *urges* the Panel to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;

30. *Requests* the Emergency Relief Coordinator to provide an update on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and any impediments to its delivery by 15 October 2024; and from UNODC, an update on its work related to this resolution by 15 October 2024;

31. *Decides* that future briefings from the Chair of the Committee to the Security Council shall take place on an annual basis to align with the latest scheduled Somalia meeting before 15 December 2024 and further decides that henceforth the Committee shall cease being described as “pursuant to resolution 751 (1992)” and instead be described as “pursuant to resolution 2713 (2023)”;

H. Preventing Al-Shabaab from accessing weapons, ammunition and military equipment

32. *Encourages* the GFRS to share with the Committee a list of licenced private security companies operating in Somalia that shall be allowed to import weapons, ammunition and military equipment required for static and mobile protection;

33. *Affirms* that paragraph 4 does not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:

- a. GFRS;
- b. SNA;
- c. NISA;
- d. SNPF; and,
- e. the Somali Custodial Corps;

34. *Decides* that paragraph 4 shall not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:

- a. United Nations personnel, including UNSOM and UNSOS;
- b. ATMIS and its Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries, as well as its strategic partners who are operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations and in cooperation and coordination with ATMIS; and,
- c. European Union training and support activities, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as any other Member State forces, with a status of forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the GFRS, provided that they inform the Committee, for information purposes only, about the existence of such agreements;

35. *Decides* that paragraph 4 shall not apply to supplies of weapons, ammunition or military equipment intended solely for the support of, or use by:

- a. Somalia's FMS and regional governments; or
- b. licenced private security companies operating in Somalia;

except in relation to items in Annexes A and B to this resolution, which are subject to the procedures as set out in paragraphs 36 and 37 to this resolution;

36. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution to FMS and regional governments, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia, to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification from the GFRS;

37. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution to FMS and regional governments, or to licenced private security companies operating in Somalia, to provide security for international and commercial premises and personnel in Somalia, are subject to notification to the Committee, for information only, at least five working days in advance by the GFRS;

38. *Decides* that all notifications should include:

- a. details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment, including type, lot/batch and serial numbers;
- b. a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity;
- c. proposed date and place of delivery; and
- d. all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit, or the intended place of storage;

39. *Decides* that where paragraphs 36 or 37 apply, the GFRS shall, no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification, for information only, in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery, including: type, quantities, lot/batch and serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, intended end-user and the specific place of storage;

40. *Affirms* that the GFRS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 36 and 37, of any deliveries of weapons, ammunition and military equipment to Somalia and stresses that all prospective suppliers of weapons and ammunition to Somalia should consult with the GFRS;

41. *Affirms* that to further avoid Al-Shabaab obtaining weapons and ammunition, weapons, ammunition and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with paragraphs 33, 34, and 35 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the recipient to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation and requests the Committee to share all notifications pertaining to paragraphs 36, 37 and 39 submitted to the Committee with the appropriate national coordinating body in Somalia, the Office of National Security, for their information;

42. *Requests* the Secretariat to support the GFRS' dissemination efforts in relation to the control of arms, ammunition and related materiel in the local language, if necessary, within its existing resources;

43. *Affirms* its commitment to working with Somalia to ensure that the procedures set out in this resolution and Annexes A and B continue to be lifted progressively, and that it shall keep the situation under constant review and be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including any modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed, in light of the progress achieved and compliance with this resolution;

44. *Decides* that paragraph 4 shall not apply to:

a. supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media, private security contractors and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

b. the delivery of non-lethal military equipment by States, or international, regional or sub-regional organisations intended solely for humanitarian or protective use; and

c. entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;

I. Reporting

45. *Requests* the following reports to the Security Council:

a. from the GFRS, in coordination and collaboration with Somalia's FMS and regional governments as appropriate, including thorough the structures of the National Security Architecture, and in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 1 May 2024 and then by 1 October 2024, reports which includes:

i. a description of Somalia's security and police institutions, and the status of regional and militia forces, as well as the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance and distribution of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;

ii. a description of the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use and storage of weapons, and any capacity building requirements in this regard;

iii. a consolidated list of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment imported in the reporting period, including: the manufacturer, type, calibre, and lot/batch and serial numbers;

- iv. the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014) and paragraph 37 of resolution 2551 (2020);
 - v. an update summarising suspicious activity documented by domestic financial institutions, and investigations and actions undertaken by the Financial Reporting Centre to counter the financing of terrorism and in a manner so as to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information; and,
 - vi. an update on specific actions taken by Somali Government authorities to counter the financing of terrorism;
- b. from the Secretary-General:
- i. an update on progress against each indicator set out in the benchmarks contained with the technical assessment report (S/2022/698) by 15 October 2024, and requests that this assessment is:
 - 1. extended to all regions of Somalia where practicable, with specific recommendations and benchmarks as appropriate; and,
 - 2. elaborates an additional benchmark on the safe management of chemical precursors associated with IED manufacture and disposal;
 - c. from organisations and states listed in paragraph 34.c of this resolution, or subsequently added, by 15 November 2024, an update on the support provided to Somalia since the adoption of this resolution and a consolidated list of the weapons, ammunition and military equipment imported in the reporting period, including: the manufacturer, type, calibre, and lot/batch and serial numbers;
46. *Encourages* the Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), including with initiatives such as “Tech Against Terrorism” to support the GFRS with analysis and reporting on the use of online platforms for terrorist purposes by Al-Shabaab, and work in collaboration with Member States in the region to facilitate capacity building in detecting and disrupting Al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities;
47. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex A – Items subject to a no-objection process*

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);
2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;
 - a. Note: (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), recoilless rifles, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);
3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;
4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel; and fuses;
6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability, including thermal and infrared, and accessories;
7. Fixed wing, swivel wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;
8. ‘Vessels’ and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
 - a. Note: ‘Vessel’ includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel;
9. Uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

* (Not applicable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Somali National Army, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Police Force and the Somali Custodial Corps).

Annex B – items requiring advance notification (for information only)*

1. All types of weapons with a calibre up to 12.7mm and associated ammunition;
2. RPG-7, LAWs (light anti-tank weapons) and recoilless rifles, and associated ammunition;
3. Weapon sights;
4. Rotor wing or helicopters specifically designed or modified for military use;
5. Body armour or protective garments, as follows:
 - a. Hard body armour plates providing ballistic protection equal to or greater than level III (NIJ 0101.06 July 2008) or national equivalents;
6. Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
7. Communication equipment specifically designed or modified for military use.

* (Not applicable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Somali National Army, the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency, the Somali National Police Force and the Somali Custodial Corps).

Annex C – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components**Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology****Part I***

1. Explosive materials and precursors, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
 - b. Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
 - c. Nitroglycerin (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses);
 - d. Nitric acid;
 - e. Sulphuric acid;
2. Explosive-related goods:
 - a. Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord);
 - b. “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paragraphs 1 and 2.a;

Part II

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - a. Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
 - b. Nitroglycol;
 - c. Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
 - d. Picryl chloride;
 - e. 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT);
2. Explosives precursors:
 - a. Ammonium nitrate;
 - b. Potassium nitrate;
 - c. Sodium chlorate;
3. Dual use items identified by the Panel:
 - a. Alarm systems with disturbance sensors, including motorcycle alarms;
 - b. Learning code receivers.

* To be notified to Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia in advance of intended shipment.

二零二四年一月十七日於行政長官辦公室

辦公室主任 許麗芳

Gabinete do Chefe do Executivo, aos 17 de Janeiro de 2024.

— A Chefe do Gabinete, *Hoi Lai Fong*.