

Resolution 2667 (2022)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 9226th meeting, on
20 December 2022**

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions and the statements of its President concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),

Determining that the situation in the DRC continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Reiterates* that the measures set forth in paragraph 1 of resolution 1807 (2008) continue to apply to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the territory of the DRC;

2. *Decides* that the notification requirements set out in paragraph 5 of resolution 1807 (2008) shall no longer apply;

3. *Requests* the Government of DRC to provide a confidential report to the Security Council no later than 31 May 2023 detailing its efforts to ensure the safe and effective management, storage, marking, monitoring and security of the national stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as efforts to fight arms trafficking and diversion;

4. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

第 5/2023 號行政長官公告

按照中央人民政府的命令，行政長官根據第3/1999號法律《法規的公佈與格式》第六條第一款的規定，命令公佈聯合國安全理事會於二零二二年十一月十七日通過的關於索馬里局勢的第2662（2022）號決議的中文和英文正式文本。

二零二三年二月七日發佈。

行政長官 賀一誠

Aviso do Chefe do Executivo n.º 5/2023

O Chefe do Executivo manda publicar, nos termos do n.º 1 do artigo 6.º da Lei n.º 3/1999 (Publicação e formulário dos diplomas), por ordem do Governo Popular Central, a Resolução n.º 2662 (2022) relativa à situação na Somália, adoptada pelo Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas em 17 de Novembro de 2022, nos seus textos autênticos em línguas chinesa e inglesa.

Promulgado em 7 de Fevereiro de 2023.

O Chefe do Executivo, *Ho Iat Seng*.

第 2662 (2022) 號決議

2022 年 11 月 17 日安全理事會第 9196 次會議通過

安全理事會，

回顧其以往關於索馬里局勢的各項決議和主席聲明，

重申尊重索馬里的主權、領土完整、政治獨立和統一，

讚揚非洲聯盟通過非洲聯盟駐索馬里特派團（非索特派團）現為非洲聯盟駐索馬里過渡時期特派團（非索過渡特派團）提供的支持，聯合國通過聯合國索馬里援助團（聯索援助團）、聯合國索馬里支助辦公室（聯索支助辦）以及其各機構、基金和方案提供的支持，索馬里問題專家小組向索馬里和 751 委員會提供的支持，以及索馬里雙邊夥伴提供的支持，

敦促索馬里繼續制定和執行武器彈藥管理政策，包括繼續為索馬里所有安全和警察機構建立一個負責任的武器分配和追蹤系統，認識到有效管理武器彈藥的責任在於索馬里聯邦政府（聯邦政府）和索馬里聯邦成員州（聯邦成員州），

表示支持聯邦政府努力重建國家，打擊恐怖主義威脅，制止販運武器和彈藥，還表示打算確保本決議中的措施將有助於聯邦政府實現這些目標，注意到索馬里的安全局勢使得這些措施仍有必要，包括嚴格控制軍火流動，但申明安理會將不斷審查索馬里局勢，並準備對本決議所載措施是否合適進行審查，包括根據所取得的進展和對本決議的遵守情況視需要對這些措施作出任何修改或者暫停或取消措施，

表示嚴重關切恐怖主義團體青年黨繼續對索馬里和該區域的和

平、安全與穩定構成嚴重威脅，還表示關切與伊黎伊斯蘭國/達伊沙有關聯的分支繼續在索馬里活動，

最強烈地**譴責**在索馬里和鄰國發生的恐怖主義襲擊，表示深為關切這些襲擊導致平民死亡，重申安理會決心支持全面努力降低青年黨在索馬里構成的威脅，敦促索馬里領導人共同努力，打擊恐怖主義，

特別指出，必須根據適用的國際法，採取整體和性別敏感的方針打擊恐怖主義和助長恐怖主義的暴力極端主義，並努力從治理、安全、穩定與和解、人權、人道主義、發展和社會經濟等層面應對這個問題，包括青年就業和消除貧困，強調必須開展區域和國際合作打擊恐怖主義、切斷恐怖主義資金來源和非法資金流動以及制止武器販運，

重申不能也不應將恐怖主義與任何宗教、國籍、文明或族裔群體聯繫在一起，譴責恐怖主義團體企圖通過對宗教的曲解和歪曲教，編造扭曲性言論，為暴力行為辯護，並鼓吹其破壞索馬里和該區域的企圖，表示關切恐怖主義團體利用信息和通信技術，包括通過互聯網特別是社交媒體，從事宣傳等恐怖主義活動，表示支持索馬里政府再次努力反擊青年黨的言論，

讚揚聯邦政府、會員國和區域組織發揮作用，扼制索馬里沿海的海盜和武裝搶劫行為，敦促繼續制定一個由索馬里主導的協調辦法，以發展索馬里海洋治理部門，包括通過組建索馬里海軍和海岸警衛隊工作組，以及為索馬里海事機構提供支持，

表示嚴重關切索馬里的人道主義局勢，鼓勵各國加大對索馬里的人道主義支持力度，並呼籲衝突各方按照國際法相關規定，包括適用

的國際人道法，並以符合聯合國人道主義緊急援助指導原則（聯合國大會第 46/182 號決議），包括人道、中立、公正和獨立的方式，允許並便利快速、無阻礙地提供必要的人道主義援助，以扶助索馬里各地需要幫助的人，回顧第 751（1992）號決議所設委員會可指認參與阻撓向索馬里運送人道主義援助或阻撓在索馬里獲取或分發人道主義援助的個人或實體，

強烈譴責在衝突局勢中蓄意以平民包括人道主義工作人員和民用物體為目標的行為，以及在居民區無差別使用武器行為及其對平民造成的後果，促請索馬里衝突各方按照國際法，包括國際人道法規定的義務，不要採取此類做法，

表示關切繼續有報告稱索馬里存在腐敗和挪用公共資源的現象，呼籲索馬里政府當局繼續努力消除腐敗，加強行政管理，提高財政透明度，善用公共資源，繼續加快改革步伐，

關切地注意到，如秘書長 2022 年關於兒童與武裝衝突的報告所述，索馬里仍然是兒童死亡人數最多的衝突地區之一，還關切地注意到違反國際法在武裝衝突中招募兒童現象和綁架現象嚴重，青年黨仍然是主要施害者，敦促索馬里政府當局進一步加強努力，處理秘書長查明的“六種嚴重侵害”兒童行為，包括根據第 2467（2019）號決議採取措施，

關切地注意到武器、軍事裝備和彈藥的走私和販運，敦促索馬里政府當局採取適當措施，查明走私者並追究其責任，

認定索馬里局勢繼續對該區域的國際和平與安全構成威脅，

根據《聯合國憲章》第七章**採取行動**，

1. **回顧**安理會在第 2628 (2022) 號決議中決定對非洲聯盟駐索馬里過渡時期特派團賦予授權，讚揚所有利益攸關方恢復合作，以便其執行任務，支持《索馬里過渡計劃》和國家安全架構，並增強索馬里能力，使其能夠逐步為本國安全承擔更大的責任；

2. **強調**安理會通過本決議的目的是根據對索馬里武器和彈藥管理能力的技術評估 (S/2022/698)，參考專家小組的最後報告 (S/2022/754) 和聯合國毒品犯罪問題辦公室 (毒品和犯罪問題辦公室) 的建議，建立一個綜合框架，以加強索馬里的國家建設與和平建設，擊敗青年黨，為聯索援助團和非索過渡特派團的任務提供補充，特別是為此：

(a) 支持在索馬里進行武器彈藥管理和安全部門改革(支柱 1)；

(b) 降低青年黨構成的威脅 (支柱 2)；

支柱 1—支持在索馬里進行武器彈藥管理和安全部門改革以及實行部分軍火禁運

3. **強調**有效的武器彈藥管理將削弱青年黨及其他意圖破壞索馬里和該區域和平與安全的行為體獲取武器彈藥的能力，降低恐怖分子對索馬里和鄰國和平與安全構成的威脅；

4. **着重指出**索馬里政府當局有責任確保安全、有效地管理和儲存武器、彈藥和其他軍事裝備庫存及分配，保障安全，包括實行一個可追蹤向部隊一級提供的此類軍事裝備和物品的系統；

5. **促請**索馬里政府當局：

(a) 進一步參與和配合執行《國家武器彈藥管理戰略》；

(b) 建立彈藥核算制度，修建足夠的軍械庫和彈藥儲存站，以加強武器儲存管理能力；

(c) 促進索馬里安全和警察機構的進一步專業化、培訓和能力建設；

6. **歡迎**對索馬里武器彈藥管理能力的技術評估（S/2022/698），讚揚索馬里取得的進展，特別是在武器管理方面取得的進展，認可技術評估的建議；

7. **歡迎**在技術評估後提出的基準，敦促索馬里政府當局共同努力，全面達到這些基準；

8. **促請**國際社會提供更多支持，以發展索馬里的武器彈藥管理能力，尤其注重武器彈藥的儲存、技術協助和能力建設，鼓勵各夥伴協調努力，以支持索馬里執行本決議的各項要求；

9. **重申**索馬里政府當局應與非索過渡特派團合作，記錄和登記在進攻行動中或執行任務過程中繳獲的所有武器和軍事裝備，包括：

(a) 記錄武器和（或）彈藥的類型和序列號；

(b) 對所有物項和相關標識進行拍照；

(c) 在重新分配或銷毀所有軍用物項前協助專家小組進行檢查；

(d) 鼓勵聯邦政府和非洲聯盟更新並實施非索觀察團-聯邦政府關於管理所收繳輕小武器統一標準作業程序，還鼓勵國際社會在這方面支持聯邦政府和非洲聯盟；

10. **決定**，為了防止青年黨和其他意圖破壞索馬里和該區域和平

與安全的行為體獲取武器彈藥，以便在索馬里建立和平與穩定，所有國家應採取必要措施，防止向索馬里運送任何武器和軍事裝備，包括禁止為一切獲取和運送武器和軍事裝備活動提供資金，禁止直接或間接提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓，但受益者如果是享有豁免，但須遵循本決議第 11、14、15 和 18 段所定程序的索馬里國家和地方各級安全和警察機構，或者如果接收者根據本決議第 21 段享有豁免，則不在此限；

11. **決定**，第 10 段不適用於僅為發展索馬里安全和警察機構、以便為索馬里人民提供安全保障而運送武器和軍事裝備或提供與軍事活動有關的技術諮詢、財政和其他援助及培訓，但本決議附件 A 和 B 所列物項除外，那些物項須適用本決議第 14 和 15 段的規定；

12. **重申**，依據本決議第 11 段豁免規定出售或供應的武器和軍事裝備不得轉售、轉讓給任何並非為最初出售或供應對象服務、或並非為出售國或供應國服務、或並非為國際、區域或次區域組織服務的個人或實體，也不得提供給此類個人或實體使用；

13. **確認** 安理會承諾與索馬里合作，確保對照技術評估（S/2022/698）所述基準取得的進展，逐步解除第 14 和 15 段以及附件 A 和 B 所述的程序；

14. **決定**，僅為發展索馬里安全和警察機構、以便保障索馬里人民安全而運送本決議附件 A 所列物項，可在委員會於接到索馬里或提供援助的國家或國際、區域或次區域組織提出通知後五個工作日內未作出反對的決定的情況下運送；

15. **決定**，僅用於發展索馬里安全和警察機構、以便為索馬里人

民提供安全保障而運送本決議附件 B 所列物項，需由索馬里或提供援助的國家或國際、區域或次區域組織提前至少 5 個工作日向委員會報備；

16. **重申**所有通知均應包括：

(a) 武器和軍事裝備的生產商和供應商的詳細情況，包括序列號；

(b) 武器彈藥的說明，包括類別、口徑和數量；

(c) 擬議的交付日期和地點；

(d) 與預定收貨單位或預定存放地點相關的所有信息；

17. **決定**索馬里當局對根據第 14 和 15 段向委員會通報向索馬里安全和警察機構運送的任何武器和軍事裝備負有首要責任；

18. **決定**，在適用第 14 或 15 段規定的情況下，索馬里或供應國或者交付援助物項的國際、區域或次區域組織應不遲於武器或軍事裝備運送後 30 天向委員會提交確認已完成交付的交付後書面通知，包括所運送武器和軍事裝備的序列號、運輸信息、提單、貨物清單或裝箱單和具體存放地點；

19. **請**秘書處與聯邦政府協商並徵得委員會批准，製作一個模板表格，用於請求事先審批、通知和交付後通知，以確保溝通的一致性；

20. **再次**請委員會與索馬里的適當國家協調機構（國家安全辦公室）分享提交給委員會的與第 14、15 和 18 段有關的所有通知，供其參考；

21. **決定**，第 10 段不適用於：

(a) 僅為支持下列各方或供其使用而供應武器或軍事裝備或提供與軍事活動有關技術諮詢、財政和其他援助以及培訓：

(一) 聯合國人員，包括聯合國索馬里援助團（聯索援助團）；

(二) 非洲聯盟駐索馬里過渡時期特派團（非索過渡特派團）以及僅在非洲聯盟最新戰略行動構想下並與非索過渡特派團協調合作開展工作的非索過渡特派團戰略夥伴；

(三) 歐洲聯盟培訓和支助活動、大不列顛及北愛爾蘭聯合王國和美利堅合眾國，以及在《索馬里過渡計劃》範圍內開展行動或為實現本決議目的與聯邦政府訂有部隊地位協定或諒解備忘錄的任何其他國家部隊，但它們須將此種協定的訂立告知委員會；

(b) 僅為個人使用目的而由聯合國人員、媒體代表以及人道主義和發展工作者及相關人員臨時運入索馬里的防護服，包括防彈背心和軍用頭盔；

(c) 國家或國際、區域或次區域組織僅為人道主義或保護目的運送非致命性軍事裝備；

(d) 運載用於防衛目的的武器和軍事裝備的船隻在索馬里港口臨時停靠，前提是這些物項必須始終留在船上（如此前由第 2244（2015）號決議第 3 段所確認）；

確認將不斷審查所有所需通知程序和各項豁免；

支柱 2—降低青年黨構成的威脅

22. **重申**青年黨對索馬里的和平與安全構成威脅，其恐怖活動和其他活動對該區域的安全構成威脅，特別指出需要通過定向制裁和切

斷資金來源，降低簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅，以及加強海上態勢感知，從而削弱青年黨的實力；

23. **特別指出**，必須根據適用的國際法，採取整體和性別敏感的方針打擊恐怖主義和助長恐怖主義的暴力極端主義，並努力從治理、安全、穩定與和解、人權、人道主義、發展和社會經濟等層面應對這個挑戰，包括青年就業和消除貧困；

24. **重申承諾**支持索馬里和該區域減少這一威脅，決定自本決議通過之日起，安全理事會關於索馬里的第 751（1992）號決議所設委員會的名稱今後改為“安全理事會關於青年黨的第 751（1992）號決議所設委員會”；

25. **認識到**安全威脅十分複雜，需要採取軍事和非軍事相結合的對策，此外還需要採取支柱 1 所述旨在加強索馬里和擊敗青年黨的措施，商定繼續努力通過以下措施削弱青年黨並加強和平與安全；

2a：定向制裁

26. **回顧**安理會第 1844（2008）、2002（2011）和 2093（2013）號決議各項決定，其中第 1844（2008）號決議作出定向制裁規定，第 2093（2013）號決議擴大了列名標準，回顧第 2060（2012）和 2444（2018）號決議各項決定，還決定第 1844（2008）號決議第 1、3 和 7 段所述措施也適用於個人，而且該決議第 3 和 7 段的規定也適用於委員會指認的下述實體：

（a）從事或支持威脅索馬里和平、安全或穩定的行為，包括威脅索馬里和平與和解進程，或以武力威脅索馬里聯邦政府或非索過渡特派團；

(b) 與青年黨有關聯，所涉行為和活動表明個人或實體與青年黨有關聯，因此應當被委員會指認，包括：

(一) 參與資助、籌劃、協助、籌備或實施青年黨所實施、夥同其實施、以其名義實施、代為實施或為支持青年黨而實施的行為或活動；

(二) 向青年黨供應、銷售或轉讓軍火及相關物資；

(三) 為其招募人員；或以其他方式支持青年黨或其任何基層組織、下屬機構、分化或衍生團體的行為或活動；

27. 再次請會員國協助專家小組進行調查，並請索馬里政府當局、非索過渡特派團和合作夥伴與專家小組分享關於列名標準所涵蓋的行為或活動的信息，特別是青年黨和其他行為體意圖破壞索馬里和平與安全的行為或活動的信息；

28. 重申，在不妨礙其他地方的人道主義援助方案執行工作的情況下，第 1844 (2008) 號決議第 3 段規定的措施不適用於為確保聯合國、聯合國專門機構或方案、在聯合國大會具有觀察員地位的提供人道主義援助的人道主義組織及其執行夥伴（包括參加聯合國索馬里人道主義應急計劃、獲得雙邊或多邊資助的非政府組織）在索馬里及時提供亟需的人道主義援助而需要的資金付款、其他金融資產或經濟資源；

2b：切斷青年黨的資金來源

29. 關切地注意到青年黨有能力創收和洗錢、儲存和轉移資源，實施恐怖主義以及破壞索馬里和該區域的穩定，請索馬里政府當局酌情與國際夥伴合作，繼續在聯邦政府領導下制定一項全面計劃，瓦解

青年黨；

30. **促請**聯邦政府繼續與索馬里金融當局、私營部門金融機構和國際社會合作，以便：

(a) 識別、評估和降低洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為的風險；

(b) 改進合規（包括強化“了解客戶”和盡職調查程序）；

(c) 加強監管和執法，包括根據《反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為法》（2016年）和《移動貨幣條例》（2019年）增加向索馬里中央銀行和金融報告中心的報告；

(d) 優先繼續開發一個安全的國家身份識別系統，以改善金融准入和合規情況，打擊資助恐怖主義行為；

(e) 改進對洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為的監測、報告和調查，同時確保金融實體根據《反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為法》的要求，按照索馬里境內洗錢和資助恐怖主義行為的風險，相應提交可疑交易和大額現金交易報告；

(f) 制定一項計劃，以降低青年黨對國家主管當局和私營部門內從事反洗錢和打擊資助恐怖主義行為工作人員構成的風險；

31. **促請**聯邦政府改進監管和執法機構之間的合作與協調，採取協調一致的聯合辦法調查資助恐怖主義行為，並實施阻斷資金戰略以扼制青年黨融資和阻止其不當利用合法金融系統；

32. **請**聯邦政府、毒品和犯罪問題辦公室和專家小組繼續交換有關青年黨活動的信息，並繼續與利益攸關方合作制定扼制青年黨活動和阻止其不當利用合法金融系統的計劃；

33. **請**聯邦政府加強與其他國家，特別是該區域其他國家，以及與國際夥伴的合作與協調，以防止和打擊資助恐怖主義行為，包括為此遵守第 1373（2001）號、第 2178（2014）號和第 2462（2019）號決議以及相關國內法和國際法；

2c：索馬里木炭禁令

34. **重申**安理會第 2036（2012）號決議第 22 段和第 2182（2014）號決議第 11 至 21 段所述關於禁止索馬里木炭進出口的決定（下稱“木炭禁令”）；

35. **歡迎**索馬里政府當局和各國為減少索馬里木炭出口而採取的措施，再次請非索過渡特派團支持和協助索馬里執行木炭禁令，並為專家小組定期走訪出口木炭的港口提供便利，重申毒品和犯罪問題辦公室及其國際夥伴必須努力監測和阻斷索馬里木炭進出口；

36. **注意到**需要減少基斯馬尤及其周圍的木炭庫存量，對港口管制結構薄弱、缺乏有能力的海岸警衛隊以及索馬里政府當局對基斯馬尤等港口失察深表關切，敦促索馬里政府當局監測和控制出口點的現有木炭庫存，並請當局考慮：

（a）移除木炭庫存，將其轉移到一個中央儲存設施，並出售木炭供國內消費；

（b）酌情在聯索援助團、毒品和犯罪問題辦公室和環境署的支持下，擬訂一次性徹底處置木炭庫存的提案，並提交委員會審議，其中包含一項明確的計劃，確保處置過程中的透明度和財務問責，以防止青年黨從銷售中獲利；

（c）酌情在其他夥伴的支持下，制定一項可持續管理國內木炭

生產的國家計劃；

2d：降低簡易爆炸裝置構成的威脅

37. **重申**，如果有足夠證據表明本決議附件 C 第一部分所列物項將用於或非常有可能用於在索馬里製造簡易爆炸裝置，所有國家應防止所涉物項從本國領土或由境外本國國民或使用懸掛本國國旗的船隻或飛機直接或間接向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓；

38. **重申**，如果根據第 37 段向索馬里直接或間接出售、供應或轉讓本決議附件 C 第一部分所列物項，相關國家應在出售、供應或轉讓完成後不超過 15 個工作日通知委員會，強調指出，根據本段發出的通知必須列入所有相關信息，包括擬裝運物項的用途、最終用戶、技術規格和數量；

39. **促請**會員國採取適當措施，推動那些參與向索馬里出售、供應或轉讓可能用於製造簡易爆炸裝置的炸藥前體或材料（除其他外包括附件 C 第二部分所列物項）的本國國民、受本國管轄者和在本國領土註冊公司或受本國管轄的公司保持警惕，記錄交易，並與索馬里、委員會和專家小組分享關於索馬里人購買或打探此類化學品的可疑活動信息，確保索馬里得到適足的財政和技術援助，用於為此類材料的儲存和分配建立適當的安全保障；

40. **鼓勵**索馬里的國際和區域合作夥伴為爆炸物處理單位開展持續專業培訓，提供適當的設備並協調支持，以增強索馬里分析爆炸物的能力；

2e：海上攔截和提高對海事領域的認識

41. **決定**將第 2182(2014)號決議第 15 和 17 段所述、並經第 2607

(2021)號決議第5段擴大以涵蓋簡易爆炸裝置部件的各項規定續延至2023年11月15日；

42. **注意到**毒品和犯罪問題辦公室與肯尼亞政府合作，在最後確定和執行《強化機構間合作以打擊肯尼亞-索馬里邊境非法貿易和消除其影響路線圖》草案方面發揮了協調作用，鼓勵索馬里與毒品和犯罪問題辦公室合作制定一項計劃，以阻斷索馬里與肯尼亞和埃塞俄比亞邊境沿線使青年黨得以從中獲利的非法貿易；

43. **鼓勵**毒品和犯罪問題辦公室在其當前任務授權範圍內，並在海上犯罪問題印度洋論壇之下：

(a) 繼續召集有關國家和國際組織加強區域合作，應對非法海上流動，阻斷可能為索馬里境內恐怖主義活動提供資金的各種形式合法和非法貨物販運；

(b) 支持索馬里提高海上態勢感知，加強執法，包括提高對漁船在販運和非法貿易中作用的認識並加強相關執法；

(c) 支持聯邦政府實施其漁業保護和執法能力示範項目；

(d) 與航運協會代表接觸，討論使這些措施更易於實行的可能方式，並在2023年提交委員會的下一期通報中提出建議；

專家小組

44. **決定**續設專家小組，任期從本決議通過之日起至2023年12月15日，並決定專家小組的任務應包括第2444(2018)號決議第11段和本決議第32和35段提及的任務，請秘書長根據安理會第2467(2019)號決議第11段在專家小組中包括具備性別問題專門能力的

成員，還請專家小組將性別平等作為貫穿各領域的問題納入各項調查和報告，表示打算不遲於 2023 年 11 月 15 日審查這一任務，並就是否延長和修改這一任務，包括限制聯邦政府進口武器彈藥問題採取適當行動；

45. **回顧**索馬里與專家小組充分合作的重要性，請索馬里政府當局協助專家小組對被拘留的青年黨嫌疑成員和其他涉案人進行訪談，指出專家小組根據 S/2006/997 號文件執行任務的重要性，請專家小組繼續向委員會提出關於如何支持聯邦政府管理武器彈藥、包括努力設立全國輕小武器委員會的建議；

46. **再次**請索馬里、各國和非索過渡特派團向專家小組提供信息，協助專家小組開展調查，敦促索馬里政府當局根據專家小組向聯邦政府提出的書面要求，便利專家小組出入查看聯邦政府在摩加迪沙的所有軍械庫、聯邦政府進口但尚未發放的所有武器和彈藥、索馬里國民軍各部門的所有聯邦政府軍事儲存設施以及索馬里保管的所有收繳武器，允許對索馬里保管的武器和彈藥拍照，允許查看聯邦政府和聯邦成員州所有記錄冊和發放記錄，以便安全理事會能夠監測和評估本決議執行情況；

報告

47. **要求**提交以下報告：

(a) 請聯邦政府酌情與聯邦成員州協調和協作，包括通過國家安全架構各機構進行協調和協作，根據第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 9 段並按照第 2244 (2015) 號決議第 7 段的要求，至遲於 2023 年 3 月 1 日、其後至遲於 2023 年 9 月 1 日提交報告，其中：

(一) 說明索馬里安全和警察機構的結構、組成、兵力和部署情況以及地區部隊和民兵部隊的狀況；

(二) 附有第 2182 (2014) 號決議第 7 段和第 2551 (2020) 號決議第 37 段所要求的聯合核查小組報告；

(三) 納入進口武器和彈藥分發後關於接收單位或軍事裝備儲存地點的通知；

(四) 概述國內金融機構記錄的可疑活動以及金融報告中心為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而開展的調查和採取的行動最新情況，同時應保護敏感信息的機密性；

(五) 關於索馬里政府當局為打擊資助恐怖主義行為而採取的具體行動最新情況；

(六) 在有資料的情況下，說明委員會所指認個人的最新情況；

(b) 秘書長至遲於 2023 年 9 月 15 日對照技術評估報告 (S/2022/698) 所載基準中的每項指標，提供最新進展情況；

(c) 專家小組：

(一) 定期向委員會通報最新情況，包括至少四份不同專題的報告；

(二) 全面通報中期最新情況；

(三) 至遲於 2023 年 10 月 1 日通過委員會提交最後報告，供安全理事會審議；

敦促專家小組就其報告所載結論徵求委員會的反饋意見；

(d) 緊急救濟協調員至遲於 2023 年 10 月 1 日通報關於在索馬里提供人道主義援助以及提供人道主義援助所遇任何障礙的最新情況；

(e) 毒品和犯罪問題辦公室至遲於 2023 年 10 月 1 日通報其與本決議有關工作的最新情況；

(f) 非洲聯盟至遲於 2022 年 12 月 1 日通報為根據第 2628(2022) 號決議計劃到 2022 年 12 月 31 日縮編 2 000 名非索過渡特派團人員進行準備的最新情況；

(g) 經本決議第 21(a)(三) 段獲得豁免的組織和國家至遲於 2023 年 10 月 15 日通報自本決議通過以來向索馬里提供支助的最新情況，並簡要通報向索馬里進口在沒有第 21 段豁免情況下需要通知委員會的用於保護部隊的物資；

48. 請負責兒童與武裝衝突問題秘書長特別代表和負責衝突中性暴力問題特別代表根據第 1960(2010) 號決議第 7 段和第 1998(2011) 號決議第 9 段與委員會分享相關信息，並邀請聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處酌情與委員會分享相關信息；

49. 回顧第 2444(2018) 號決議第 6 和 7 段，其中概述了吉布提和厄立特里亞之間懸而未決的問題，重申安理會將繼續跟蹤了解厄立特里亞與吉布提關係正常化的發展情況，並且將支持兩國本着誠意解決這些事項，表示注意到秘書長 2019 年 2 月 18 日、2019 年 8 月 2 日、2020 年 7 月 29 日、2021 年 7 月 30 日和 2022 年 7 月 26 日的信，對雙方之間的未決問題沒有取得明顯進展感到遺憾，但欣見雙方繼續以對彼此負責任的方式行事，沒有出現關於負面事態發展的報告，回

顧第 2444 (2018) 號決議第 57 段表示安理會打算繼續審查關於請秘書長提交報告的要求，決定目前不要求秘書長進一步提供最新情況；

50. 決定繼續積極處理此案。

附件 A

須經無異議程序的物項

1. 地對空導彈，包括便攜式防空導彈系統（肩扛式防空導彈）；

2. 口徑大於 14.7 毫米的武器和專門為這些武器設計的部件，以及相關彈藥；

（a）註：（這不包括肩射反坦克火箭發射器，例如火箭榴彈或輕型反坦克武器、槍榴彈或榴彈發射器。）；

3. 口徑大於 82 毫米的迫擊炮及相關彈藥；

4. 反坦克制導武器，包括反坦克制導導彈和彈藥以及專門為這些物項設計的部件；

5. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的火藥和裝置；地雷和相關材料；

6. 有高於第 2 代夜視功能的武器瞄準鏡；

7. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的固定翼、轉動翼、傾斜旋翼或傾斜翼飛機；

8. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的“載體”和兩棲車輛；

（a）註：“載體”包括任何船舶、表面效應運載工具、小水平面積的船隻或水翼船以及船隻的船體或船體一部分；

9. 無人駕駛作戰飛機（在聯合國常規武器登記冊中列為第四類）。

附件 B

需要預先通知的物項

1. 口徑最大達 14.7 毫米的所有類型武器及相關彈藥；
2. 火箭榴彈-7 和無後坐力炮及相關彈藥；
3. 有第 2 代或更低夜視功能的武器瞄準鏡；
4. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的旋轉翼飛行器或直升機；
5. 防彈服或防護服，如下：
 - (a) 提供等於或大於 III 級標準（美國國家司法研究所 NIJ 0101.06 標準，2008 年 7 月）或國家等同標準的防彈保護的硬防彈服；
6. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的陸地車輛；
7. 專為軍事用途設計或改裝的通信設備。

附件 C

簡易爆炸裝置組件

爆炸材料、炸藥前體、爆炸相關設備和相關技術

第一部分

1. 下列爆炸材料和含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料的混合物：
 - (a) 硝化棉（含氮量大於 12.5% w/w）；
 - (b) 三硝基苯基甲硝胺；
 - (c) 硝酸甘油（但按藥用劑量單個包裝/配製的情況除外）；
2. 爆炸相關物品：
 - (a) 專門設計用於通過電氣或非電氣方式引爆炸藥的設備和裝置（例如點火裝置、引爆裝置、點火器、導爆索）；
3. 第 1 和 2 段所列物項的“生產”或“使用”所需的“技術”，包括：

第二部分

1. 下列爆炸材料和含有其中一種或多種爆炸材料的混合物：
 - (a) 硝銨燃油炸藥（銨油炸藥）；
 - (b) 硝酸乙二醇；
 - (c) 季戎四醇四硝酸酯；
 - (d) 氯化吡咯；

(e) 三硝基甲苯 (梯恩梯) ;

2. 炸藥前體 :

(a) 硝酸銨 ;

(b) 硝酸鉀 ;

(c) 氯酸鈉 ;

(d) 硝酸 ;

(e) 硫酸。

Resolution 2662 (2022)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 9196th meeting, on
17 November 2022**

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia,

Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,

Commending the support provided by the African Union through the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) now the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), by the United Nations through the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSO), the United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) and through its agencies, funds and programmes, by the Panel of Experts on Somalia, both to Somalia and the 751 Committee, and by Somalia's bilateral partners,

Urging Somalia to continue to codify and implement weapons and ammunition management policies, including continued development of an accountable weapons distribution and tracing system for all Somali security and police institutions, *recognising* that effective weapons and ammunition management is the responsibility of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Somalia's Federal Member States (FMS),

Expressing support for the FGS in its efforts to reconstruct the country, counter the threat of terrorism, and stop the trafficking of weapons and ammunition, further expressing its intention to ensure the measures in this resolution will enable the FGS in the realisation of these objectives, *noting* that the security situation in Somalia continues to necessitate these measures, including strict controls on the movement of arms, but affirming that it shall keep the situation in Somalia under constant review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including any modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed, in light of the progress achieved and compliance with this resolution,

Expressing grave concern that the terrorist group Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and *further expressing* concern at the continued presence in Somalia of affiliates linked to ISIL/Da'esh,

Condemning in the strongest possible terms terrorist attacks in Somalia and neighbouring states, expressing deep concern at the loss of civilian life from these attacks, *reiterating* its determination to support comprehensive efforts to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and urging Somalia's leaders to work together on the fight against terrorism,

Underscoring the importance of a holistic and gender sensitive approach to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, stabilisation and reconciliation, human rights, humanitarian, development, and socioeconomic dimensions of the problem, including youth employment and the eradication of poverty, and emphasising the importance of regional and international cooperation to counter terrorism, disrupt terrorist finances and illicit financial flows, and stop arms trafficking,

Reiterating that terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group, condemning terrorist groups' attempts to craft distorted narratives that are based on the misinterpretation and misrepresentation of religion to justify violence and to popularise their attempts to undermine Somalia and the region, *expressing* concern over their exploitation of information and communication technologies including through the Internet, particularly social media, for terrorist purposes such as propaganda, and supporting the Government of Somalia's renewed efforts to counter Al-Shabaab's narratives,

Commending the role played by the FGS, member states, and regional organisations to suppress piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, and *urging* continued development of a Somalia-led, coordinated approach in developing Somalia's maritime governance sector, including through the formation of the Somali Navy and Coast Guard Working Group, and support of Somalia's maritime institutions,

Expressing serious concern about the humanitarian situation in Somalia, *encouraging* States to scale-up their humanitarian support to Somalia, and calling for all parties to the conflict to allow and facilitate, in accordance with relevant provisions of international law, including applicable international humanitarian law, and in a manner consistent with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance (United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/182), including humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, the rapid and unhindered provision of humanitarian assistance necessary to support persons in need across Somalia and recalling that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) may designate individuals or entities that engage in obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia,

Strongly condemning the deliberate targeting of civilians, including those who are humanitarian personnel, and civilian objects in situations of conflict, as well as the indiscriminate use of weapons in populated areas and their consequences for the civilian population, *calling upon* all parties to the conflict in Somalia to refrain from such practices in accordance with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law,

Expressing concern at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources in Somalia, and calling for the Somali Government authorities to continue efforts to address corruption, strengthen administrative management, improve financial transparency, make good use of public resources and continue to accelerate the pace of reform,

Noting with concern that Somalia remains one of the deadliest conflict areas for children, as outlined in the 2022 Report of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, *further noting* with concern the high levels of recruitment of children in armed conflict in violation of international law and high levels of abductions, with Al-Shabaab continuing to be the main perpetrator, and *urging* the Somali Government authorities to further strengthen efforts to address the “six grave violations” against children as identified by the Secretary-General, including by implementing measures in line with resolution 2467 (2019),

Noting with concern smuggling and trafficking of weapons, military equipment and ammunition and *urging* the Somali Government authorities to take appropriate measures to identify smugglers and hold them accountable,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Recalls* its decisions in resolution 2628 (2022) to authorise ATMIS, and commends the renewed cooperation between all stakeholders to implement its mandate in support of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) and the National Security Architecture and empower Somalia to assume progressively greater responsibility for its own security;

2. *Emphasises* that its objective, through this resolution, is to establish a consolidated framework, drawing on the technical assessment of Somalia’s weapons and ammunition management capability (S/2022/698), and taking note of the final report of the Panel of Experts (S/2022/754) and recommendations from the United Nations Office on Drugs Crime (UNODC), to strengthen state- and peace-building in Somalia, defeat Al-Shabaab and complement the mandates of UNSOM and ATMIS, including in particular through:

(a) Supporting weapons and ammunition management and security sector reform in Somalia (pillar 1); and

(b) Degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab (pillar 2);

Pillar 1 – supporting weapons and ammunition management and security sector reform in Somalia and the partial arms embargo

3. *Emphasises* that effective weapons and ammunition management will reduce the ability of Al-Shabaab, and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region, to obtain weapons and ammunition, and reduce the threat to peace and security posed by terrorists, in Somalia and neighbouring states;

4. *Underlines* the responsibility of the Somali Government authorities to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment and their distribution, including implementation of a system which allows the tracking of such military equipment and supplies to the unit level;

5. *Calls upon* the Somali Government authorities to:

(a) further engage and cooperate on implementation of the National Weapons and Ammunition Management Strategy;

(b) establish an ammunition accounting system, and build sufficient armouries and ammunition storage areas to strengthen the capacity of stockpile management; and

(c) promote further professionalisation, training and capacity-building of Somali security and police institutions;

6. *Welcomes* the technical assessment of the weapons and ammunition management capability of Somalia (S/2022/698), commends Somalia for the progress made, especially with regards to weapons management, and endorses the technical assessment's recommendations;

7. *Welcomes* the benchmarks proposed following the technical assessment, and urges the Somali Government authorities to work together to meet them fully;

8. *Calls upon* the international community to provide additional support to develop weapons and ammunition management capacity in Somalia, with a particular focus on weapons and ammunition storage, technical assistance, and capacity building, and encourages partners to coordinate their efforts to support Somalia implement the requirements of this resolution;

9. *Reaffirms* that the Somali Government authorities, in cooperation with ATMIS, shall document and register all weapons and military equipment captured as part of offensive operations, or in the course of carrying out their mandates, including:

- (a) recording the type and serial number of the weapon and/or ammunition;
- (b) photographing all items and relevant markings;
- (c) facilitating inspection by the Panel of all military items before their redistribution or destruction; and
- (d) encourages the FGS and African Union to update and implement the Harmonised AMISOM-FGS Standard Operating Procedure on the Management of Recovered Small Arms and Light Weapons and further encourages the international community to support the FGS and AU in this regard;

10. *Decides* that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Somalia by preventing Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region from obtaining weapons and ammunition, take the necessary measures to prevent all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, except where the beneficiary is Somalia's security and police institutions at the national and local level, who are exempt, subject to the procedures set out in paragraphs 11, 14, 15 and 18 to this resolution, or where the recipient is exempt as per paragraph 21 to this resolution;

11. *Decides* that paragraph 10 shall not apply to deliveries of weapons and military equipment, or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities, intended solely for the development of Somalia's security and police institutions, to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to items in Annexes A and B to this resolution, which are subject to the procedures as set out in paragraphs 14 and 15 to this resolution;

12. *Reaffirms* that weapons and military equipment sold or supplied in accordance with the exemption in paragraph 11 of this resolution shall not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the recipient to which it was originally sold or supplied, or the selling or supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation;

13. *Confirms* its commitment to working with Somalia to ensure that the procedures set out in paragraphs 14 and 15, and Annexes A and B are lifted

progressively, in light of progress made against the benchmarks set out in the technical assessment (S/2022/698);

14. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex A to this resolution, intended solely for the development of Somalia's security and police institutions, to provide security for the Somali people, may be provided in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of receiving a notification from Somalia or the State or international, regional or sub regional organisation delivering assistance;

15. *Decides* that deliveries of items in Annex B to this resolution, intended solely for the development of Somalia's security and police institutions, to provide security for the Somali people, are subject to notification to the Committee for information submitted at least five working days in advance by Somalia or the State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation delivering assistance;

16. *Reaffirms* that all notifications should include:

- (a) details of the manufacturer and supplier of the weapons and military equipment, including serial numbers;
- (b) a description of the arms and ammunition including the type, calibre and quantity;
- (c) proposed date and place of delivery; and
- (d) all relevant information concerning the intended destination unit, or the intended place of storage;

17. *Decides* that the Somali authorities have the primary responsibility to notify the Committee pursuant to paragraphs 14 and 15, of any deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somali security and police institutions;

18. *Decides* that where paragraphs 14 or 15 apply, Somalia or the supplying State or international, regional or sub-regional organisation delivering the assistance shall, no later than 30 days after the delivery of weapons and military equipment, submit to the Committee a post-delivery notification in the form of written confirmation of the completion of any delivery, including the serial numbers for the weapons and military equipment delivered, shipping information, bill of lading, cargo manifests or packing lists, and the specific place of storage;

19. *Requests* the Secretariat to produce, in consultation with the FGS and for approval by the Committee, a template form for requests for advance approval, notifications and post-delivery notifications to ensure consistency of communications;

20. *Reaffirms* its request that the Committee shares all notifications pertaining to paragraphs 14, 15 and 18, submitted to the Committee with the appropriate national coordinating body in Somalia, the Office of National Security, for their information;

21. *Decides* that paragraph 10 shall not apply to:

- (a) supplies of weapons or military equipment or the provision of technical advice, financial and other assistance, and training related to military activities intended solely for the support of, or use by:
 - (i) United Nations personnel, including the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM);
 - (ii) the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and its strategic partners, operating solely under the latest African Union Strategic Concept of Operations, and in cooperation and coordination with ATMIS; and,

(iii) European Union training and support activities, Türkiye, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, as well as any other State forces that are either operating within the STP, or have a status of forces agreement or a memorandum of understanding with the FGS to serve the purposes of this resolution provided they inform the Committee about concluding such agreements;

(b) supplies of protective clothing, including flak jackets and military helmets, temporarily exported to Somalia by United Nations personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for their personal use only;

(c) the delivery of non-lethal military equipment by States, or international, regional or subregional organisations intended solely for humanitarian or protective use; and

(d) entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying weapons and military equipment for defensive purposes provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels (as previously affirmed by paragraph 3 of resolution 2244 (2015)); and

confirms it will keep all notification processes required and exemptions under review;

Pillar 2 – degrading the threat posed by Al-Shabaab

22. *Reiterates* that Al-Shabaab poses a threat to peace and security in Somalia, and that its terrorist and other activities pose a security threat to the region, and underscores the need to degrade Al-Shabaab through targeted sanctions and disrupting its finances, by reducing the threat posed by improvised explosive devices and by improving maritime domain awareness;

23. *Underscores* the importance of a holistic and gender sensitive approach to counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, conducted in accordance with applicable international law, as well as efforts to address the governance, security, stabilisation and reconciliation, human rights, humanitarian, development, and socioeconomic dimensions of the challenge, including youth employment and the eradication of poverty;

24. *Reiterates* its commitment to support Somalia and the region to reduce this threat and decides that from the date of the adoption of this resolution the name of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia shall henceforth be known as the “Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab”;

25. *Recognises* that the security threat is complex and requires a combined, military and non-military response and, in addition to the measures outlined in Pillar 1, which are designed to strengthen Somalia and defeat Al-Shabaab, and agrees to continue efforts to degrade Al-Shabaab and strengthen peace and security through the following measures;

2a: Targeted sanctions

26. *Recalls* its decisions in its resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and its resolutions 2002 (2011), and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and recalls its decisions in its resolutions 2060 (2012) and 2444 (2018), and further decides that the measures in paragraphs 1, 3, and 7 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall also apply to individuals, and that the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 7 of that resolution shall also apply to entities, designated by the Committee as:

(a) having engaged in, or provided support for, acts that threatened the peace, security or stability of Somalia, including acts that threatened the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia, or threatened the Federal Government of Somalia or ATMIS by force; and

(b) being associated with Al-Shabaab, acts and activities indicating that an individual or entity is associated with Al-Shabaab, and therefore eligible for designation by the Committee include:

(i) participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of Al-Shabaab;

(ii) supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to Al-Shabaab; and

(iii) recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Shabaab or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof;

27. *Reiterates* its request for Member States to assist the Panel of Experts in its investigations, and for Somali Government authorities, ATMIS and partners to share information with the Panel of Experts regarding conduct or activities, in particular by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia, where covered by listing criteria;

28. *Reaffirms* that without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of its resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialised agencies or programmes, humanitarian organisations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organisations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;

2b: Disrupting Al-Shabaab's finances

29. *Notes* with concern Al-Shabaab's ability to generate revenue and launder, store and transfer resources, to carry out terrorism and destabilise Somalia and the region, and requests the Somali Government authorities, working with international partners as appropriate, to continue to develop under FGS leadership a comprehensive plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's;

30. *Calls upon* the FGS to continue working with Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to:

(a) identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks;

(b) improve compliance (including enhanced Know Your Customer and due diligence procedures);

(c) strengthen supervision and enforcement, including through increased reporting to the Central Bank of Somalia and Financial Reporting Centre in line with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter the Financing of Terrorism Act (2016), as well as the Mobile Money Regulations (2019);

(d) prioritise the continued development of a secure national identification system to improve financial access and compliance and counter the financing of terrorism;

(e) improve monitoring, reporting and investigations into money laundering and terrorist financing while ensuring that financial entities transmit suspicious transactions and large cash transaction reports in proportion with the money laundering and terrorist financing risks in Somalia, as required under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Law; and

(f) develop a plan to mitigate the risks posed by Al-Shabaab to personnel working in anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing roles within national competent authorities and the private sector;

31. *Calls upon* the FGS to improve collaboration and coordination among regulatory and law enforcement agencies and undertake coordinated and joint approaches to terrorist finance investigations and implement disruption strategies to counter-Al-Shabaab's finances and its exploitation of the licit financial system;

32. *Requests* the FGS, UNODC and the Panel to continue exchanging information about Al-Shabaab's operations and to continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al-Shabaab's operations and exploitation of the licit financial system;

33. *Requests* the FGS to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other States, particularly other States in the region, and with international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, including through compliance with resolution 1373 (2001), resolution 2178 (2014), resolution 2462 (2019), and relevant domestic and international law;

2c: Somalia Charcoal Ban

34. *Reaffirms* its decision to ban the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2036 (2012), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014) hereafter "the charcoal ban";

35. *Welcomes* measures taken by the Somali Government authorities and States to reduce the export of charcoal from Somalia, reiterates its requests that ATMIS support and assist Somalia in implementing the charcoal ban and facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports and reaffirms the importance of the efforts of the UNODC and its international partners to monitor and disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia;

36. *Notes* the need to reduce the size of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo, and expresses deep concerns about the weak port control structures, lack of a capable coastguard and oversight by the Somali Government authorities of ports, including Kismayo, urges the Somali Government authorities to monitor and control existing charcoal stockpiles at export points, and requests them to consider:

(a) removing and relocating the charcoal stockpile to a central storage facility and sell the charcoal for domestic consumption;

(b) developing, with the support of the UNSOM, UNODC and UNEP as appropriate, and submitting a proposal for consideration by the Committee, for the one-off, complete disposal of charcoal stockpiles, to include a clear plan for ensuring transparency and fiscal accountability during the disposal process, to prevent Al-Shabaab from profiting from the sale; and

(c) developing a national plan for the sustainable management of domestic charcoal production, with support from other partners, as appropriate;

2d: Reducing the threat posed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

37. *Reaffirms* that all States shall prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to this resolution to Somalia from their

territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) will be used, or a significant risk they may be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices;

38. *Reaffirms* that, where an item in part I of Annex C to this resolution is directly or indirectly sold, supplied or transferred to Somalia consistent with paragraph 37, the State shall notify the Committee of the sale, supply or transfer no more than 15 working days after the sale, supply or transfer takes place, and stresses the importance that notifications pursuant to this paragraph contain all relevant information, including the purpose of the use of the item(s), the end user, the technical specifications and the quantity of the item(s) to be shipped;

39. *Calls upon* Member States to undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of explosive precursors and materials to Somalia that may be used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including among other things items in part II of Annex C, to keep records of transactions and share information with Somalia, the Committee and the Panel regarding suspicious purchases of or enquiries into these chemicals by individuals in Somalia and to ensure that Somalia is provided with adequate financial and technical assistance to establish appropriate safeguards for the storage and distribution of materials;

40. *Encourages* international and regional partners of Somalia to implement continued specialist training of Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams and to provide appropriate equipment and coordinate support to reinforce Somali capacity in the analysis of explosives;

2e: Maritime interdiction and improving maritime domain awareness

41. *Decides* to renew the provisions set out in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 2182 (2014), and expanded by paragraph 5 of resolution 2607 (2021) to cover IED components, until 15 November 2023;

42. *Notes* UNODC's coordination role in finalising and implementing the draft Roadmap for Enhanced Inter-Agency Cooperation to Combat Illicit Trade and its Effects Along the Kenya-Somalia Border in partnership with the Government of Kenya, and encourages Somalia to work with UNODC to develop a plan to disrupt illicit trade along Somalia's borders with Kenya and Ethiopia from which Al-Shabaab profits;

43. *Encourages* the UNODC, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime, to:

(a) continue to bring together relevant States and international organisations to enhance regional cooperation on responding to illicit maritime flows and disrupt all forms of trafficking in licit and illicit goods that may finance terrorist activities;

(b) support Somalia to improve their maritime domain awareness and enforcement, including in relation to the role of fishing vessels in trafficking and illicit trade;

(c) to support the FGS with its fisheries protection and enforcement capability demonstrator project; and

(d) to engage with shipping association representatives to discuss possible ways to make these measures more implementable and propose recommendations in its next briefing to the Committee in 2023;

Panel of Experts

44. *Decides* to renew, with effect from the date of adoption of this resolution, until 15 December 2023, the Panel of Experts, and that their mandate shall include the tasks referred to in paragraph 11 of resolution 2444 (2018), paragraphs 32 and 35 of this resolution, requests the Secretary-General to include dedicated gender expertise, in line with paragraph 11 of its resolution 2467 (2019) and further requests the Panel to include gender as a cross-cutting issue in its investigations and reporting, and expresses its intention to review this mandate and take appropriate action regarding any extension and modification of this mandate, including restrictions on the import of weapons and ammunition by the FGS, no later than 15 November 2023;

45. *Recalls* the importance of full co-operation between Somalia and the Panel of Experts, requests Somali Government authorities to facilitate for the Panel of Experts interviews of suspected members of Al-Shabaab and other persons of interest held in custody, notes the importance of the Panel of Experts carrying out their mandate in line with document S/2006/997, and requests the Panel of Experts to continue to give recommendations to the Committee on how to support the FGS in weapons and ammunition management, including efforts towards establishing a National Small Arms and Light Weapons Commission;

46. *Reiterates* its request for Somalia, States, and ATMIS to provide information to the Panel, and assist them in their investigations, urges the Somali Government authorities to facilitate access for the Panel, on the basis of written requests to the FGS by the Panel, to all FGS armouries in Mogadishu, all FGS-imported weapons and ammunition prior to distribution, all FGS military storage facilities in Somalia National Army (SNA) sectors and all captured weaponry in Somali custody, and to allow photographs of weapons and ammunition in Somali custody and access to all FGS and FMS logbooks and distribution records, in order to enable the Security Council to monitor and assess implementation of this resolution;

Reporting

47. *Requests* the following reports:

(a) from the FGS, in coordination and collaboration with FMS as appropriate, including thorough the structures of the National Security Architecture, and in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), by 1 March 2023 and then by 1 September 2023, reports which include:

- (i) a description of the structure, composition, strength and disposition of Somalia's security and police institutions, and the status of regional and militia forces;
- (ii) the reports of the Joint Verification Team (JVT) requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014) and para 37 of resolution 2551 (2020);
- (iii) incorporating the notifications regarding the destination unit or the place of storage of military equipment upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition;
- (iv) an update summarising suspicious activity documented by domestic financial institutions, and investigations and actions undertaken by the Financial Reporting Centre to counter the financing of terrorism and in a manner so as to protect the confidentiality of sensitive information;

- (v) an update on specific actions taken by Somali Government authorities to counter the financing of terrorism; and
 - (vi) an update on the status of individuals designated by the Committee, where information is available;
 - (b) from the Secretary-General an update on progress against each indicator set out in the benchmarks contained with the technical assessment report (S/2022/698) by 15 September 2023;
 - (c) from the Panel of Experts:
 - (i) regular updates to the Committee, including a minimum of four different thematic reports;
 - (ii) a comprehensive mid-term update; and
 - (iii) for the Security Council's consideration through the Committee a final report by 1 October 2023;
- and urges the Panel of Experts to seek feedback from the Committee on the findings of their reporting;
- (d) from the Emergency Relief Coordinator, an update on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and any impediments to its delivery by 1 October 2023;
 - (e) from UNODC, an update on its work related to this resolution by 1 October 2023;
 - (f) from the African Union, by 1 December 2022, an update on its preparations for the planned drawdown of 2000 ATMIS personnel by 31 December 2022 in accordance with resolution 2628 (2022); and
 - (g) from organisations and states exempted via paragraph 21.a.iii of this resolution by 15 October 2023, an update on the support provided to Somalia since the adoption of this resolution and a summary of the materiel imported to Somalia for force protection that would, in the absence of paragraph 21, need be notified to the Committee;

48. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011), and invites the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to share relevant information with the Committee, as appropriate;

49. *Recalls* paragraphs 6 and 7 of resolution 2444 (2018), which outlined outstanding issues between Djibouti and Eritrea, reaffirms that it will continue to follow developments towards the normalisation of relations between Eritrea and Djibouti and will support the two countries in the resolution of these matters in good faith, takes note of the Secretary-General's letters of 18 February 2019, 02 August 2019, 29 July 2020, 30 July 2021, and 26 July 2022 and regrets there has been no noticeable progress on the outstanding issues between them but welcomes the fact that both parties have continued to act responsibly towards each other and there have been no negative developments reported, recalls paragraph 57 of resolution 2444 (2018) expressed its intention to keep its request for reporting from the Secretary-General under review, and decides not to seek a further update from the Secretary-General at this time;

50. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex A – Items subject to a no-objection process

1. Surface to air missiles, including Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS);
2. Weapons with a calibre greater than 14.7 mm, and components specially designed for these, and associated ammunition;
 - (a) Note: (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers such as RPGs or LAWs (light anti-tank weapon), rifle grenades, or grenade launchers.);
3. Mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm and associated ammunition;
4. Anti-tank guided weapons, including Anti-tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
5. Charges and devices specifically designed or modified for military use; mines and related materiel;
6. Weapon sights with a night vision capability greater than generation 2;
7. Fixed wing, swivel wing, tilt rotor or tilt wing aircraft, specifically designed or modified for military use;
8. ‘Vessels’ and amphibious vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
 - (a) Note: ‘Vessel’ includes any ship, surface effect vehicle, vessel of small waterplane area or hydrofoil and the hull or part of the hull of a vessel;
9. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (listed as Category IV in the UN Register of Conventional Arms).

Annex B – items requiring advance notification

1. All types of weapons with a calibre up to 14.7mm and associated ammunition;
2. RPG-7 and recoilless rifles, and associated ammunition;
3. Weapon sights with a night vision capability generation 2 or lower;
4. Rotor wing or helicopters specifically designed or modified for military use;
5. Body armour or protective garments, as follows:
 - (a) Hard body armour plates providing ballistic protection equal to or greater than level III (NIJ 0101.06 July 2008) or national equivalents;
6. Ground vehicles specifically designed or modified for military use;
7. Communication equipment specifically designed or modified for military use.

Annex C – Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Components**Explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology****Part I**

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - (a) Nitrocellulose (containing more than 12.5% nitrogen w/w);
 - (b) Trinitrophenylmethylnitramine (tetryl);
 - (c) Nitroglycerin (except when packaged/prepared in individual medicinal doses);
2. Explosive-related goods:
 - (a) Equipment and devices specially designed to initiate explosives by electrical or non-electrical means (e.g. firing sets, detonators, igniters, detonating chord);
3. “Technology” required for the “production” or “use” of the items listed at paragraphs 1 and 2, including:

Part II

1. Explosive materials, as follows, and mixtures containing one or more thereof:
 - (a) Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO);
 - (b) Nitroglycol;
 - (c) Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN);
 - (d) Picryl chloride;
 - (e) 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (TNT);
2. Explosives precursors:
 - (a) Ammonium nitrate;
 - (b) Potassium nitrate;
 - (c) Sodium chlorate;
 - (d) Nitric acid;
 - (e) Sulphuric acid.

二零二三年二月九日於行政長官辦公室

辦公室主任 許麗芳

Gabinete do Chefe do Executivo, aos 9 de Fevereiro de 2023.

— A Chefe do Gabinete, *Hoi Lai Fong*.

政府總部事務局**批示摘錄**

透過簽署人二零二三年一月五日批示：

根據現行第14/2009號法律《公務人員職程制度》第十三條第一款（一）項、（二）項、第二款（四）項，以及現行第12/2015號法律《公共部門勞動合同制度》第四條第二款及第三款的規定，以附註方式修改下列人員在本局擔任職務的合同第三條款如下所列。

**DIRECÇÃO DOS SERVIÇOS PARA OS ASSUNTOS
DA SEDE DO GOVERNO****Extractos de despachos**

Por despachos da signatária, de 5 de Janeiro de 2023:

O pessoal abaixo identificado — alterada, por averbamento, a cláusula 3.^a dos seus contratos para o exercício de funções nestes Serviços, nos termos das alíneas 1) e 2) do n.º 1 e da alínea 4) do n.º 2 do artigo 13.º da Lei n.º 14/2009 (Regime das carreiras dos trabalhadores dos serviços públicos), em vigor, e dos n.ºs 2 e 3 do artigo 4.º da Lei n.º 12/2015 (Regime do Contrato de Trabalho nos Serviços Públicos), em vigor, conforme a seguir discriminado: